

Craccum

Registered for transmission by post as a newspaper.

VOLUME 45 NO 17

5 cents off campus

ALL OUT NOW!



July 30 Mobilisation in wake of Pentagon Papers

A consideration of the Pentagon Papers as reported in the western and local presses collated by Walter Pollard with an introduction by Stephen Chan.

Tomorrow, tens of thousands of New Zealanders will march through their city streets to protest against the continuation of the Indo-China War and against the New Zealand Government's compliance with United States hypocrisy in perpetuating this monstrosity.

The daring publication of the Pentagon Papers should end once and for all any doubts or hesitations. The United States Government has lied and deceived for several years, at the same time entangling itself deeper and deeper in its attempt for self-vindication.

Mr Pollard has collated considerations of the Pentagon Papers as they have appeared in the western and local presses. The Bantam Book containing an edited version of the actual Papers should be on sale in New Zealand within a week.

Craccum has xeroxed copies of the Papers as they appeared in

the New York Times before the temporary halt in publication. They can be read in the Editor's office. None of the Papers in our possession deal with New Zealand's involvement in the War, and it is doubtful whether such an account can be found in the Bantam Edition. The descriptions of how the United States cajoled its participation in the War were

CONTENTS

- The Pentagon Papers as reported in the Western Press by Walter Pollard.
- Military Supported Research and the Pacific Rim Strategy by Prof Keith Buchanan.
- Research studies for the Military...by Keith Buchanan.
- War Crimes and the Viet Nam war by Prof Gabriel Kolko.
- Ecocide in Viet Namby Keith Buchanan.
- Laotian bombing.....by Senator McCloskey.
- Tearaway News Supplement.....(apologies to Salient).



49 High St Auckland

CONTINUED

deliberately withheld by Daniel Ellsberg to prevent international embarrassment. That speaks for itself.

It is inconceivable how any government involved can any longer claim sincerity and honesty. Yet it seems to be a defensive psychological mechanism to piously ignore all evidence. New Zealanders should take note of the pronouncements of their Parliamentary representatives and perceive for themselves the duplicity which informs such men.

The organizers of tomorrow's Mobilisation expect to exceed the figure of 15,000 marchers in Auckland. The demonstration will include workers, teachers, school pupils, lecturers, students, clergy and a large body of Asian students studying in New Zealand. Every member of the public is invited to participate.

Many New Zealanders still believe the official Government account of halting the spread of communism. The Pentagon Papers reveal an admission by former U.S. Assistant Secretary for Defence McNamara that United States presence in Viet Nam was 70% "to avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat; 20% to keep South Viet Nam territory from Chinese hands; 10% to permit the people of South Viet Nam to enjoy a better, freer way of life; to emerge from the crisis without unacceptable taint from methods used".

And so much also for the claims of helping the South Vietnamese to freedom. That people have been subjected to immense atrocity in order to save American feelings of humiliation.

The political game continues in Viet Nam under direction, or with approval from Washington. Thieu, busily immersed in bullying his way to a second term as South Vietnamese President will no doubt conduct the Washington chorus of triumphant democracy when his bullying is completely successfully. Members of his own elitist Government are happy to scorn American

verbosity about liberty and justice, by supplying the American army with drugs. Members of his large collection of Generals are happy to falsify reports, claiming large victories, in order to retain their own pinnacles of power. Corrupt customs officials are happy to collect sizeable 'taxes' on all incoming goods. And how much of the meagre Government 'aid' to the Vietnamese they butchered in the first place, ever insinuates itself through to the victims of allied pride;

By their own official documents, leaders in the United States have admitted the conduct of saturation bombing of North Viet Nam under engineered pretexts; the reluctance to negotiate meaningfully at Paris while blaming the National Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese for lack of progress; the ascendancy of their pride in order to continue their methods of war, against the recommendations of their own intelligence reports.

The Papers contain a harrowing description of men grown too powerful and too conceited by their positions. Assuming the grandeur of the American myth unto themselves, they have chosen to split even their own nation, rather than capitulate.

In our own nation, our Parliamentary representatives are concerned to remain the carbon copy of such stubbornness. For considerable time the New Zealand Government has had a merely contented population to answer to. Now that the Government's deceit has out, Governmental apologists hope to quell the movement out of blind acquiescence by labelling protesters as irresponsible trouble-makers.

The Mobilisation tomorrow night, invites all members of the public to question the Government on its own massively irresponsible trouble making, thrust upon entire populations, destroying the land, culture and autonomy of those unfortunate enough to receive its gracious brand of freedom.

WALTER POLLARD ON THE PAPERS

According to the New Zealand Government White Paper, New Zealand troops were sent to Vietnam: at the request of the South Vietnamese Government.

The newspaper said the documents revealed that the late President Kennedy sent Vice-President Johnson to Saigon in May, 1961, with orders to encourage Mr Diem to request United States ground troops.

OPPOSED

Mr Diem originally opposed the request, saying he did not want foreign troops on Vietnamese soil except in the case of direct aggression by North Vietnam.

Mr Diem successfully balked at the Kennedy-Johnson proposal for five months but with the military situation rapidly deteriorating he yielded, in October, 1961, and made the solicited request for United States troops.

— N.Z. Herald, 26 June, 1971.

that New Zealand was bound to do so, because it would be repelling aggression.

(Note: the reason for President Diem's refusal was that aggression had not taken place).

A Pentagon study concluded that the vast majority of the Vietcong troops were of local origin and that there was little evidence that they were receiving major supplies from outside.

Mr Maechling estimated that the Vietcong were getting only a trickle of supplies from North Vietnam and said no one had ever found a Chinese rifle or Soviet weapon used by the guerrillas. He concluded that the massive aggression theory was phony.

The President got essentially the same word from a White House adviser, Michael Forrestal, when Mr Forrestal returned from Vietnam early in 1963. He estimated that most of the Vietcong recruits and supplies came from inside South Vietnam itself.

— N.Z. Herald, 26 June, 1971.

that the war was just and legal: President Diem.

He pointed out that United States troops would violate the 1954 Geneva Accords that ended the French war in Indo-China.

— N.Z. Herald, 26 June, 1971.

that it was a question of the "Free World" versus Communism:

The Sun-Times said that President Kennedy, on taking office in January, 1961, had been confronted by reports from the United States Embassy in Saigon that Mr Diem was in danger of being overthrown because of his repressive policies and the toleration of corruption at the top of his Government. The CIA said Mr Diem was growing progressively weaker and was vulnerable to a coup by non-Communist elements.

— N.Z. Herald, 26 June, 1971.

that New Zealand was fighting to preserve Democracy and the right of people to choose their own Government.

President Kennedy deepened his commitment to a non-Communist South Vietnam, despite a report by Charles Maechling, jun., that if free elections were to be held in South Vietnam in 1962 the North Vietnamese President, Ho Chi Minh, would get 70 per cent of the popular vote.

The Sun-Times said the documents showed that President Eisenhower was warned in advance by the CIA that Mr Diem would balk at the elections, but the President did nothing to ensure that they were held.

— N.Z. Herald, 26 June, 1971.

the basic assumption underlying all this is that we are a decent, peace-loving people while "they" are aggressive:

The Chicago Sun-Times said yesterday that documents it had acquired showed that the late President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, overruled advice from the CIA that the Communists in Vietnam would remain in a state of relative quiescence if the then Prime Minister, Ngo Dinh Diem, held the elections required by the 1954 Geneva Accord.

— N.Z. Herald, 26 June, 1971.

that we live in an Open Society while "they" live by plotting criminal activities:

The Sun-Times said that other matters related in the documents and previously reported show that President Kennedy ordered an extensive programme of secret raids on North Vietnam in March, 1961, three years before the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

— N.Z. Herald, 26 June, 1971.

that our Allies are Honourable men:

The documents, disclosed to the newspaper by several reliable sources, reveal that the raids were carried out under the direction of two secret agencies in Washington—known as the 303 Committee and Special Group Counter-Insurgency, co-chaired by President Kennedy's brother, the late Robert F. Kennedy.

— N.Z. Herald, 26 June, 1971.

that Our Side would never be the first to employ atomic weapons:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff calculated that three divisions, about 100,000 men, would be needed if North Vietnam invaded; and six divisions and possibly tactical nuclear weapons if Communist China intervened.

— N.Z. Herald, 26 June, 1971.

FITTING ACTION

What follows are simply Press-cuttings. For your information. If you come to the conclusion that these tend to refute the New Zealand Government White Paper's thesis you could press your Member of Parliament to expedite the withdrawal of New Zealand Troops. Or, take any other action you may see fit.


The matter is extremely urgent since all the evidence goes to show that the War is not coming to an end, because President Nixon plans to leave the U.S. Air Force in Indochina indefinitely, to subject these people to the equivalent of two Hiroshimas a week, simply to support Governments which need the equivalent of two Hiroshimas a week to survive the wrath of their own people. The rejection of such a genocidal policy by New Zealand would not be an insignificant factor in making such a policy impossible.

The attention of the Reader is also drawn to the fact that the crime of planning and waging aggressive war is one for which the Germans paid the penalty at Nuremberg; and that their allies faced similar Tribunals. . . .

Would all New Zealand citizens who read the following documents, all of which have appeared in the Western Press, please consider their implications with regard to New Zealand's present position?

But even when Johnson ordered new moves increasing United States participation in the actual fighting and keeping this deeper involvement from Congress, the available record shows almost no protest among the President's closest advisers against what they knew to be deceptions of the American people. . . .

It is difficult to read these documents and go on repeating the old cliché that successive United States Governments stumbled into the war and then blindly staggered from one escalation to the next.



Ellsberg . . . revealer of secrets

Actually, the estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency particularly on the effect of the bombing, proved to be quite good. The CIA said repeatedly that it did not think the United States bombing would either break the spirit of the North Vietnamese or stop the flow of military supplies from the North into South Vietnam.

Two assumptions were repeatedly made to justify the American war effort, long after the factual basis for them was shaky.

These were that the United States was engaged in stopping a major strategic world move by Moscow and Peking; and that failure to stop it in Vietnam would lead to spectacular Communist victories elsewhere and therefore to a major change in the Asian balance of power, detrimental to the vital interests of the United States.

More than that, the intelligence estimates were that United States ground troops would not necessarily assure victory because whatever America put in, the enemy would match.

Nevertheless, LBJ seems not to have been able to conceive of the notion that these enemy soldiers, about whose character and culture he knew very little, could possibly withstand the threats, let alone the use, of American military power.

— By JAMES RESTON of the New York Times news service, Washington (Herald, June 15, 1971).

...The Johnson Administration, although its President was reluctant and hesitant to take the final decisions, intensified the covert warfare against North Vietnam and began planning in the spring of 1964 to wage overt war, a full year before it publicly revealed the depth of its involvement and its fear of defeat.

The Pentagon study concludes that these four succeeding Administrations built up the American political, military and psychological stakes in Indo-China, often more deeply than they realised at the time.

They did so with large-scale military assistance to the French in 1950; with acts of sabotage and terror warfare against North Vietnam beginning in 1954; with moves that encouraged and abetted the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam in 1963; with plans, pledges and threats of further action that sprang to life in the Tonkin Gulf clashes in August, 1964; with the careful preparation of public opinion for the years of open warfare that were to follow. . . .

What the Pentagon papers call an elaborate programme of covert military operations against North Vietnam began on February 1, 1964, under the code name Operation Plan 34A. President Johnson ordered the programme on the recommendations of Mr McNamara, in the hope, held very faint by the intelligence community, that progressively escalating pressure from the clandestine attacks might eventually force Hanoi to order the Vietcong guerrillas and the Pathet Lao to halt their insurrections.

Through 1964, the 34A operations ranged from flights over North Vietnam by US spy planes and kidnappings of North Vietnamese citizens for intelligence information, to parachuting sabotage and psychological warfare teams into the north, commando raids from the sea to blow up rail and highway bridges and the bombardment of North Vietnamese coastal installations by PT boats.

The study makes clear that the months from the beginning of 1964 to the Tonkin Gulf incident in August were a pivotal period.

In this phase the United States was mounting clandestine military attacks against North Vietnam and planning to obtain a congressional resolution that the Administration regarded as the equivalent of a declaration of war.

The papers show that these far-reaching measures were not improvised in the heat of the Tonkin crisis.

When the Tonkin incident occurred, the Johnson Administration did not reveal these clandestine attacks, but pushed the previously prepared resolution through both Houses of Congress on August 7, 1964.

— By NEIL SHEEHAN of the New York Times, New York (Herald, June 16 1971).

The Chicago Sun-Times said yesterday that documents it had acquired showed that the late President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, overruled advice from the CIA that the Communists in Vietnam would remain in a state of relative quiescence if the then Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem held the elections required by the Geneva Accord. . . .

The President did nothing to ensure that they were held.


— (Herald, June 26 1971).

...Still, as it appeared in print, it invited a number of provocative conclusions about the war and the men who waged it. Among its implied or stated judgments:

That all the before Johnson Congress and the balance by the Administration against North drafted a very widened war considerably so "general consequence Presidential or victory through campaign, says" was held off decided on the first time in A embargo held "gradual and v did his part: he knew of "no promulgated".

That the a re-examined the sharply contested Asia would for planners seem similarly state non-Communist paper as to w increasing acceptance was likewise Vietnam actually Vietnamese ou accepted that critically on the last John McN per cent "to South Vietnam permit the people life".

That the w America's awe eventually covered repeatedly qu betrayed by ev raids, the U.S. Vietnam's Pre in the south study, was "ut bombing in M simply wasn't pause—and the massive troop excerpts, cover bombing pause back home. T they would in the pauses as by turns and f the screw".




Riddiford Pentagon F

...The P elaborate program North Vietnam Directed from Laos, raids or Chinese comm Vietnamese co were attackin Tonkin, off gathering intel

The assum insurgency in Vietnam coul damage. Botl Washington's flatly that "t Vietnam are in

Even so, a perhaps because alternatives o most political saw the begin according to public statem then, "the go escorting reco



That all the major decisions to escalate were scripted months before Johnson took them—and that the Administration deceived Congress and the public to cover them up. Far from being caught off balance by the Gulf of Tonkin incident of August 1964, the Administration had been secretly planning for major military action against North Vietnam for at least five months—and had already drafted a version of the Congressional resolution supporting a widened war. The Pentagon analysis contends further, on considerably sketchier evidence that the war planners had reached a "general consensus" on bombing by Sept. 7, 1964—in the midst of a Presidential campaign casting Barry Goldwater as the apostle of victory through air power and LBJ as the man of peace. (The campaign, says the Pentagon study, was one reason why the bombing was held off till the following year.) And finally, when Johnson decided on committing U.S. ground troops to offensive action for the first time in April 1965, he directed that the order be kept secret (the embargo held for two months) and that the shift be made to seem "gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy". The President did his part: he told a news conference the day of the decision that he knew of "no far-reaching strategy that is being suggested or promulgated".

That the assumptions behind the war, once settled, were rarely re-examined thereafter. The CIA, in a mid-1964 memo to Johnson, sharply contested the domino theory—the notion that all South-east Asia would fall if Vietnam went Communist—but Administration planners seemed nevertheless to have subscribed to it. The papers similarly state and restate that the U.S. goal was "an independent, non-Communist South Vietnam", but they reflect little discussion on paper as to what sort of Vietnam it ought to be otherwise—and increasing acceptance that a military regime might have to do. There was likewise little apparent debate over what the U.S. stake in Vietnam actually was and what cost to this country and the Vietnamese ought to be sustained in pursuit of victory. The planners accepted that America's power and influence in the world were critically on the line; one memo to McNamara from his deputy, the last John McNaughton, suggested that the purpose of fighting was 70 per cent "to avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat", 20 per cent "to keep South Vietnam... from Chinese hands" and only 10 per cent "to permit the people of South Vietnam to enjoy a better, freer way of life".

That the war managers put a great deal of faith in the view that America's awesome military power, applied in graduated doses, would eventually cow Hanoi. This assumption, the papers suggest, was repeatedly questioned by intelligence estimates—and repeatedly betrayed by events. Before and after the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin reprisal raids, the U.S. sent messages via a Canadian intermediary to North Vietnam's Premier Phan Van Dong, warning Hanoi to turn off the war in the south or face the consequences. Phan Van Dong, said the study, was "utterly unimpressed". The Johnsonians began sustained bombing in March 1965—and discovered within a month that it simply wasn't working. The response was a five-day bombing pause—and the application of more power with the beginnings of the massive troop buildup. One installment of the Washington Post's excerpts, covering the later Johnson years, suggested that subsequent bombing pauses were ordered mainly to recapture public opinion back home. The Johnson policymakers had little expectation that they would induce Hanoi to negotiate; one paper, indeed, refers to the pauses as part of a "ratchet" strategy to reduce and raise tensions by turns and finally to crack the enemy's will with "one more turn of the screw".

(Newsweek, June 28, 1971).



Riddiford... even his prime minister cannot see the Pentagon Papers, yet he talks of the national security.

...The Pentagon papers show that on February 1, 1964, "an elaborate program to covert military operations against the state of North Vietnam" was begun under the code name Operation Plan 34A. Directed from Washington, the program consisted of U-2 flights over Laos, raids on North Vietnam by South Vietnamese and Nationalist Chinese commando teams and naval bombardment along the North Vietnamese coastline. At the same time, Laotian and American pilots were attacking Communist forces in Laos, while in the Gulf of Tonkin, off North Vietnam, patrolling American destroyers were gathering intelligence data in an operation called DeSoto.

'CARROT-AND-STICK'

The assumption behind these undertakings was that the Viet Cong insurgency in the south was directed by Hanoi, and that North Vietnam could be persuaded to desist if it suffered enough material damage. Both assumptions, however, went against the view of Washington's intelligence experts. One analysis of the period declared flatly that "the primary sources of Communist strength in South Vietnam are indigenous".

(Newsweek, June 28, 1971).

Even so, an air war seemed to most officials to be the only answer, perhaps because, as the Pentagon study puts it, "we had run out of alternatives other than pressures" and bombing appeared to be the most politically acceptable form of pressure. In Laos, December 1964 saw the beginning of Operation Barrel Roll, attacks by American jets on "targets of opportunity". The National Security Council, according to the Pentagon study, agreed that there would be no public statement on the attacks unless a plane was lost, and that even then, "the government should continue to insist that we were merely escorting reconnaissance flights".

After the New Year, the air war spread to Vietnam. On Jan. 6, William Bundy wrote Secretary Rusk that Saigon's morale was "very shaky indeed", because of fears among the South Vietnamese that the U.S. was not willing to raise its ante. Conceding that "stronger action obviously has grave difficulties", Bundy continued: "Nonetheless, on balance we believe that such action would have some faint hope of really improving the Vietnamese situation, and, above all, would put us in a much stronger position to hold the next line of defense, namely Thailand". Early in February, a turning point arrived. During a visit by McGeorge Bundy the Viet Cong attacked a U.S. compound in Pleiku and another base 4 miles away, killing nine Americans. Within fourteen hours, 49 U.S. Navy jets struck North Vietnam in reprisal.

(Newsweek, June 28 1971)

NEUTRALIZATION: DIRTY WORD

One of the few documents in the McNamara study to quote Lyndon Johnson directly is a message the President sent to his ambassador in Saigon, Henry Cabot Lodge, in March 1964. Nearly a year before, French President Charles de Gaulle had proposed, in effect, that Vietnam should be neutralized, and in the interim the idea that the U.S. should pursue less than total victory had begun to take hold in other quarters. Excerpts from the President's position on the subject:

It ought to be possible to explain in Saigon that your mission is precisely for the purpose of knocking down the idea of neutralization wherever it rears its ugly head and on this point I think that nothing is more important than to stop neutralist talk wherever we can by whatever means we can. I have made this point myself to (Senate Majority Leader Mike) Mansfield and (columnist Walter) Lippmann and I expect to use every public opportunity to restate our position firmly. You may want to convey our concern on this point to General Khanh and get his ideas on the best possible joint program to stop such talk in Saigon, in Washington, and in Paris.

(Newsweek, June 28, 1971).

By early 1964, the U.S. was supporting and directing a number of covert operational air strikes over Laos by CIA-hired civilian pilots and by Thai flyers, South Vietnamese harassment raids (Operation '34A) along the North Viet Nam coast, and U-2 reconnaissance flights over the North. Announced U.S. retaliatory air strikes against the North started in August 1964. A sustained air campaign (Rolling Thunder) was ordered to assault the North in February, 1965. The first U.S. ground troops landed in force in South Viet Nam during the spring of 1965. By the end of the year, 184,000 U.S. troops had been deployed in the South....

One vista revealed a U.S. Government far less interested in negotiations on either Laos or Viet Nam than its public stance indicated. In fact, the U.S. sought ways to avert international pressure for talks. It continually withheld from the American people a full disclosure of its increasing military moves against North Viet Nam, but often briefed Hanoi, Peking and Moscow on precisely what it intended. Moreover, the documents, while showing a stubborn allegiance to the domino theory of Viet Nam's critical significance despite CIA doubts, also reveal a shifting rationale for the massive U.S. commitment....

...Then, in January 1965, McNamara pencilled his approval on a statement by his assistant, McNaughton, that the real U.S. goal was "not to help friend, but to contain China". A month later, McNaughton, demonstrating the McNamara team's fondness for figures, put the U.S. aims in a far different order: "70%—to avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat. 20%—to keep SVN (South Viet Nam) territory from Chinese hands. 10%—to permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life. Also—to emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods used". That was hardly an idealistic statement of U.S. purposes....

Concealment of Air Strikes. The documents reveal that, in Operation Barrel Roll, the CIA was regularly using U.S. civilian pilots flying U.S. planes to make air strikes along infiltration routes in Laos early in 1964. In December, this campaign was stepped up to semiweekly attacks by regular U.S. Air Force and Navy flyers, but the National Security Council ordered: "There would be no public operations statements about armed reconnaissance (a euphemism for operations in which pilots were allowed to attack any target they find rather than limited to assigned targets) in Laos unless a plane were lost. In such an event the Government should continue to insist that we were merely escorting reconnaissance flights as requested by the Laotian Government".

Concealment at Tonkin. The North Vietnamese Pt-boat attacks on the U.S. destroyer Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964 were among the most pivotal and controversial events of the war—and the Johnson Administration clearly deceived the public about them. U.S. officials claimed to be unaware that South Vietnamese naval units had been covertly operating in the area shortly before the Maddox was fired upon. McNamara was asked at a press conference on Aug 5, 1964: "Have there been any incidents that you know of involving the South Vietnamese vessels and the North Vietnamese?" His reply: "No, none that I know of". Yet the secret Pentagon study declares that "at midnight on July 30, South Vietnamese naval commandoes under General Westmoreland's command staged an amphibious raid on the North Vietnamese islands of Hon Me and Hon Ngu in the Gulf of Tonkin. Apparently (the North Vietnamese boats that attacked the Maddox) had mistaken Maddox for a South Vietnamese escort vessel". The rapidity of U.S. air reprisals—within twelve hours of Washington's receipt of the news—argued that the U.S. had been positioned to strike as soon as attacked....

Administration officials framed a Tonkin Gulf-style resolution long before the PT-boat attacks but failed to ask Congress for concurrence on what they were doing in Viet Nam. The State Department's Bundy writes of how Canada's J. Blair Seaborn, a member of the International Control Commission in Viet Nam, could be "revved" up to carry secret messages to Hanoi. McNaughton described the Saigon government as being "in such a deep funk it may throw in the sponge".

The most abrasive treatment of an ally was Taylor's schoolmaster scolding of a group of young South Vietnamese generals, including Nguyen Cao Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu, after they had dismissed the civilian High National Council. Said Taylor: "Do all of you understand English? I told you all clearly at General Westmoreland's dinner we Americans were tired of coups. Apparently I wasted my words. Now you have made a real mess. We cannot carry you forever if you do things like this". Taylor's irritation seemed justified, but, as General Nguyen Khanh said last week, "He was convoking me as if he were MacArthur on occupation of Japan".

Provocation Plans. Although the option apparently was never exercised, secret documents indicate that U.S. planners were seriously considering provoking the North Vietnamese into attacking U.S. units so that an open retaliatory air attack could be made against the North, a key escalation of the conflict. The step would be a prelude to sustained air strikes against the North. A Pentagon "Plan of Action for South Viet Nam", drafted by McNaughton in September 1964, proposed actions that "should be likely at some point to provoke a military response (and) the provoked response should be likely to provide good ground for us to escalate if we wished". He suggested that the downing of any U.S. reconnaissance plane over the North by U-2 aircraft would be an appropriate incident....

Shaken by McCone's vigorous dissent, Johnson submitted a searching question to the CIA: Would the rest of South-east Asia fall into Communist hands if South Viet Nam and Laos did? The reply took issue with the conventional application of the domino theory. "With the possible exception of Cambodia", said the CIA, "it is likely that no nation in the area would quickly succumb to Communism". The spread of Communism would not be "inexorable"....

Equally prescient and independent was Under Secretary of State George Ball. Unswayed by the technocrats around him, he kept warning respectfully that their course was wrong. His memo to President Johnson on July 1, 1965, took account of souls, and French history, as well as weapons. It concluded: "No one can assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on our terms, no matter how many hundred thousand white, foreign (U.S.) troops we deploy. Once we deploy substantial numbers of troops in combat, it will become a war between the U.S. and a large part of the population of South Viet Nam. U.S. troops will begin to take heavy casualties in a war they are ill-equipped to fight in a noncooperative if not downright hostile countryside. Once we suffer large casualties, we will have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so great that we cannot—without national humiliation—stop short of achieving our objectives. I think humiliation would be more likely—even after we have paid terrible costs"....

(Time, June 28 1971)



Nixon... two faces as usual



Ky, Thieu & Minh... manoeuvres ahead

Not that the thousands and thousands of words and pages from the Pentagon archives reveal any secrets. That Johnson is a liar, that McNamara is a liar, that Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, Rostow, Taylor are liars all is scarcely news to anyone free from hypnotic loyalty to what's official, authoritative and governmental.

The Times' expose proves the case against this knavish lot with their own papers and their own words. That's nice, but what's really good about the Times' material is that it provides us with an exact and textured knowledge of these men's mendacity, their stupidity and their presumption. The material allows us at last to match the lies they told us with their secret truths.

WITH PRECISION

So while American officials were doing their hearts and flowers act about the brave, aggressed-upon free people of South Vietnam, John T. McNaughton, Assistant-Secretary of Defence, is writing a memorandum stating our war aims with a precision these guys reserve for their private moments: "70%—to avoid a humiliating US defeat to our reputation as a guarantor; 20%—to keep South Vietnam and adjacent territory from Chinese hands; 10%—to permit the people of South Vietnam to enjoy a better, freer way of life".

And even that 10% is suspect. For another of the Times' documents gives a specific example of how we respect Vietnamese freedom.

This is an airgram to Washington from our ambassador-proconsul-gauleiter, General Maxwell Taylor, giving the verbatim transcript of his bawling out the Vietnamese military leaders because he didn't like their political manoeuvres: "Do all of you understand English?... I told you all clearly at General Westmoreland's dinner, we Americans we're tired of coups. Apparently I wasted my words. Maybe this is because something is wrong with my French because you evidently didn't understand... noe you have made a real mess. We cannot carry you forever if you do things like this".

In the course of this dressing down. Admiral Cang protests to the American viceroy: "It seems that we are being treated as though we were guilty. What we did was good and we did it only for the good of the country".

To that Taylor replies: "Now let me tell you how I feel about it... I don't know whether we will continue to support you after this...."

These men must have thought they were superhuman. You get it from the code names they picked for their military operations. Hardnose, Pierce Arrow, Flaming Dart and Rolling Thunder.

It is impossible to read through these documents without feeling repeated rushes of bitterness. The admission they were carrying on offensive warfare against North Vietnam before the Gulf of Tonkin, their own doubts that North Vietnam did control the National Liberation Front, and perhaps worst, that all the talk about going about the earth looking everywhere for a peace table to sit at, that all of it was lies....

Once more, there's nothing new. We've always known that what they wanted is unconditional surrender. But on paper, in their words, in their own personal style, it is so bald, so devoid of rationalizations, so empty of pity.

Like McGeorge Bundy writing about the impending decision to destroy North Vietnam with bombers: "Yet measured against the cost of defeat in Vietnam this programme seems cheap. And even if it fails to turn the tide—as it may—the value of the effort seems to us to exceed its cost".

You don't learn anything new, but what you know is confirmed. Like McNamara, the Albert Speer of this filthy business. If you think that language is overdrawn, read what the Pentagon historians write:....

—By NICHOLAS von HOFFMAN of the Washington Post.
(The Auckland Star, June 23 1971).

Since Thieu has said little to indicate that he stands for anything except a continued war-policy. . . .

(Herald, June 4 1971)

Veiled Threat. The President and his Vice President have never been the best of friends, but their enmity has rarely been more apparent than last week. The cause of the heightened ill feeling: a stinging speech by Ky that blasted the Thieu administration. In the speech, a prelude to next October's presidential election campaign, in which Ky would like to oppose Thieu's re-election, the Vice President described Thieu's regime as a "dictatorship" and said that it was worse than a Communist dictatorship "because it is disguised". The armed forces, declared Ky, "cannot be strong because of the plague of corruption. The present military strength is a phony strength that can collapse at any moment". Then, in a thinly veiled threat against Thieu, Ky added "Those Vietnamese who have the habit of being the servants of the colonialists and who practice the policy of family dictatorship have to take my warning as a serious one".

The editions of fourteen Saigon newspapers that reported the speech were promptly confiscated by the government for carrying articles that were "a threat to national security".

(Time, June 28 1971).

. . . . Moreover, many of the legislators who voted in favour of the government's bill had, as one Saigon wit put it, "somewhere between 500,000 and 700,000 good reasons to be happy—one for each of the plasters he had received to vote for the measure". That was a high price—\$1,350 to \$1,850 at the black-market exchange rate—and the open way in which the government's representatives offered cash for votes was, in the words of a Western diplomat, "gross". . . .

. . . . And even some of Thieu's supporters wondered why the usually cautious President had risked such a blatant power play. The most likely explanation, aside from his desire to be a majority President, is that Thieu had concluded that his re-election was by no means guaranteed. In a direct match with Big Minh, the race might be close enough, especially in view of recent South Vietnamese military reverses in Laos and Cambodia. . . .

. . . . Another option, suggested as a possibility by some of Ky's aides, was that the two aspirants might both withdraw from the race on the ground that the election bill is "unfair, undemocratic, and unconstitutional".

Nightmare: The first option could be a political disaster for Thieu; the second would be a nightmare for the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. One of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker's chief concerns is that the election should appear (our emphasis) respectable to the world at large. . . .

(Newsweek, June 21 1971)

We first became involved in Viet Nam to contain China. . . it is now safe for us to trade with China, and safe to negotiate an A.B.M. agreement with Russia, it should be safe, at last, to bring our soldiers home from Vietnam.

Conclusion of Time Essay,
(June 14, 1971);

"By his own account Ellsberg had spent much of the last 9 months trying to convince Washington officialdom of the study's importance. . . . By this time he was convinced that the Nixon Administration was merely continuing the same strategy Johnson had followed and that its policy would lead inexorably "to the destruction of North Vietnam" by January 1973. "Henry, I smell 1964 all over again" Ellsberg remembered telling Kissinger.

— Newsweek, June 28, 1971.

SOME REASONS FOR THIS:

1. Jean Laconture, *Nouvel Observateur*, 15 March 1971 speaks of the ever-present danger to the U.S. deciding upon the total destruction of the dams and dykes of North Vietnam, and also the danger of the introduction of atomic weapons into the war. . . .

2. As early as April 16, 1954, in an address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors Nixon proposed the U.S. send its own troops into Indochina if France gave up the fight and made peace at Geneva. "I have visited Vietnam many times," Nixon said the other night in his latest appeal for public support in bringing about a "just peace." Indeed he has, and in every visit he has sought to deepen American entanglement. One of the earliest was his visit to Hanoi (then still in French hands) in November, 1963, to make a speech opposing the idea of a negotiated peace and head off the Geneva conference. Another visit is worth keeping in mind as we approach another rigged Presidential election in South Vietnam to keep Thieu in power. That visit was on July 6, 1956. Diem had just succeeded in electing himself a rubber-stamp Constituent Assembly by suppressing many independent candidatures, arresting many opposition leaders and by so restricting freedom of speech and press that most of the opposition finally boycotted the elections. Nixon in an address to the Assembly said "the entire free world" derived "great inspiration" from Diem's achievements. When Nixon tells us as he did in his latest speech that we must hang on and end the war in a way which will achieve the goal of "a South Vietnam free to determine its own future," it is well to remember that first fake election under Diem. For two decades we have been imposing puppet regimes of Saigon in the name of self-determination. But the stale double-talk still goes on.

Nixon says that when he left office as Vice President in January 1961 there were no American combat forces in Vietnam. He didn't say he soon did all he could to put them in. In February 1962 after Kennedy sent General Harkins to Vietnam to head a U.S. Military Assistance Command, the Republican National Committee's publication *Battle Line* (Feb 13) declared that Kennedy had been "less than candid" about U.S. military involvement, asked whether we were moving toward a "new Korea" and said the American people should not have to wait "until American casualty lists are posted" before knowing the full truth. Two days later Nixon disagreed in a statement saying—

I don't agree at all with any partisan or other criticism of the U.S. buildup in Vietnam. My only question is whether it may be too little and too late. . . . I support President Kennedy to the hilt, and I only hope he will step up the buildup and under no circumstances curtail it because of possible criticism.

Shortly afterwards "18 Notables", including Roman Catholic leaders, appealed first to Diem and then to the U.S. Ambassador (March 13, 1962) for the restoration of elementary political and civil rights, declaring that popular support had been alienated by widespread repression. Nixon turned as deaf an ear as Kennedy to this appeal for the freedom we were supposedly defending.

In 1964 as the presidential campaign warmed up, Nixon said Lyndon Johnson, then pretending to be dovish, "lacks the idealism and sense of purpose" both Eisenhower and Kennedy "were able to project" and that under Johnson it was hard to find a place on the map of the world "where the U.S. is not being kicked around, insulted, blackmailed or threatened." This struck the first note of Nixon's now familiar "poor, pitiful giant" theme. On his return from a tour of Asia (April 16) he called for military action against bases in North Vietnam and Laos to show the "enemy he can no longer have privileged sanctuary," and repeated a call for "hot pursuit" into Laos and North Vietnam in a speech two days later before that favorite forum of his, the American Society of Newspaper Editors. "To win the war," he told them, "the initiative must be carried north". Perhaps Nixon (who was about to address the Society again as this was written) likes to address our senior editors because they so obligingly forget what he does not wish the public to remember.



AGAINST A NEGOTIATED WITHDRAWAL

When Johnson finally began to bomb North Vietnam and to send in combat troops in 1965, it was a triumph for Nixon. He opened the year by proposing (Jan 26) that the U.S. Navy and Air Force be used to bomb supply routes and staging areas in Laos and Vietnam; he conceded this might bring a direct conflict with China but said negotiation would be tantamount to "surrendering on the installment plan". After Johnson's first air raids on North Vietnam in February, Nixon declared them insufficient and called for U.S. warplanes to bomb supply lines "day by day, and for that matter, night by night" (Feb. 10). Fifteen days later he asked Johnson to reject any peace talks that would require U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam. On April 2 he approved Johnson's introduction of gas warfare. In September after Johnson had widened the war in the air and on the ground, Nixon returned from another visit to Vietnam and (Meet the Press, Sept 12) declared himself more optimistic. He called for the bombing of military targets in Hanoi and two months later (same program, Nov. 21), asked Johnson to mine Haiphong harbor. In November he joined Dean Acheson in signing a Freedom House manifesto saying that critics of the war "have a right to be heard, but they impose on the rest of us the obligation to make unmistakably clear the nation's firm commitment" to Vietnam.

Johnson could never do enough in Vietnam to please Nixon. In August of 1966, after another visit to Vietnam, Nixon called for a 25% increase in U.S. troops, bringing the total to 500,000 men. He said he was "convinced" that such a massive buildup would reduce casualties! He warned the American Legion later that month "if Vietnam falls, the Pacific will be transformed into a Red Ocean." A year later he was still echoing military criticism of Johnson for "gradual escalation" and calling instead (Boston Aug. 21, 1967) for "massive pressure" short only of nuclear weapons. In October of that year in Chicago Nixon reached a new point of hysteria. He declared the alternative to a "successful" conclusion of the Vietnam war might be World War III. He said it was necessary to make the American people realize U.S. "vital strategic interests" in the conflict and to bring home to them that "this war is about peace and freedom in the world." In February 1968 he criticized Johnson's "bombing pause," a pause in which some people hoped negotiations might begin.

Can a man so tricky and so brazen as to distort that past record ever be trusted? The record helps us to understand what Nixon meant on April 7 when he appealed for support "to end this war—but to end it in a way that will strengthen trust for America around the world." What he means is not trust but fear. What he means is that America's will must be imposed on Indochina, at whatever cost to its people and ours.

—I.F. Stone's Bi-Weekly,
April 19, 1971.

3. Q. What does Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine envision in terms of U.S. air support in Indochina after these troops are pulled out?

LAIRD: I would envision that the U.S. presence as far as Asia is concerned, as far as Naval forces are concerned, as far as Air Forces are concerned, that this would be part of the realistic deterrent which we will maintain in Asia.

Q. Do you envision those air and naval units remaining in combat in carrying out that role?

LAIRD: I wouldn't care to discuss that particular question. I look forward to the reduction of warfare in that area of the world and I do not believe that we should look forward to the maintenance of that kind of warfare. We must maintain a capability, however, in order to be realistic about the situation that we do face there, and in order to restore peace and to maintain peace in that area.

— Press conference at the Pentagon
April 13 (abridged)

Emmett DUDMAN (Chicago Sun Times): Mr President you mentioned ending our involvement in the war in Vietnam and yet the

Secretary of Defense said the other day that we would remain in South Vietnam (sic). How do you reconcile these two statements or is there a conflict there in your opinion?

The PRESIDENT: No. Mr Dudman, there really isn't any conflict. . . . I said that we would end our involvement. . . . I said that our goal is total American withdrawal from Vietnam. . . . As far as Mr Laird's statement was concerned, what he was referring to was that pending the time that we can have a total withdrawal consistent with the principles that I laid down last week, it will be necessary to the U.S. to retain air power and to retain some residual forces. . . .

— American Society of Newspaper Editors
April 16.

I implemented a plan to train and equip the South Vietnamese; to withdraw American forces, and to end American involvement in the war just as soon as the South Vietnamese had developed the capacity to defend their country against Communist aggression.

— Nixon's address of April 7.

The Vietnamization plan is not completed yet, so we still have many things to do not only in the military field, but in other fields, socially, politically and economically. So if Vietnamization means making South Vietnam strong, capable to defend itself, it will take 15 or 20 more years.

— Vice President Ky at an impromptu news conference in Saigon at which he also said that if Senator McGovern came to Vietnam "I will kick him out personally." AP in *Baltimore Sun*, April 19. (The same day the *New York Daily News* Saigon correspondent Joseph Fried quoted Ky as terming a military victory and invasion of the North impossible and saying, "both parts of Vietnam must stop the war. . . . We are not going to fight and kill each other forever.")

— I. F. Stone's Bi-Weekly,
May 3, 1971.

4. One unpublished portion of the secret Pentagon history of the Vietnam war covers the period in 1954 in which President Nixon played a key role in the debate over the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons and United States combat forces in North Vietnam to prevent the downfall of the French.

Former officials of the Eisenhower Administration asserted yesterday that Mr Nixon, then the Vice-President, supported the use of tactical nuclear weapons and the commitment of United States combat forces.

In the spring of 1954, as the French were being surrounded by the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford, is reported to have sought authority to use tactical nuclear weapons to break the siege.

It was widely assumed at the time that Mr Nixon and the late Secretary of State, Mr John Foster Dulles, supported Radford.

— Thomas Rose of the *Chicago Sun-Times*.
(N.Z. Herald, 18 June 1971).

As for removing ground troops from Vietnam, Nixon is just playing domestic politics. Your soldiers have no more will to fight anyway—why should they?

What really matters is your air force. That's what prevents the patriotic forces from capturing main cities and keeps the gang of crooks you call allies in power.

Without your planes and helicopters, their armies—really mercenaries—would melt away overnight. But I've heard nothing about withdrawing air support. . . .

— Sihanouk, *The Auckland Star*,
June 29, 1971.

The main judicious 'USA to the weapons but techniques 140,000 off the Military these same Biological & Convention: million doll Operations l In the econ from organis Development strengthening social and poi groupings suc companies) in their prograr underline the character of in

TH It's against th research funds systems involv battlefield", th the penetration being depended problems involv field but also in customs, beliefs Rim countries manipulated in of the regio Rockefeller—ha funding of western-orient Ramparts, April Asia May-June illustrate this been the role development w and which has concerned.

TI According to Department of behavioral scien \$5.2 million is million is for fr May, 1969, p. S Karmow that ir employing near year in Departr use of the unive America was ex the ambitious infiltration of Countries Proje government and Berreman in N disclosure of anthropological the University Thailand and th Ethics Commit described as "el efforts which with overt and the future of a parts of the w 1970). In a letter to the increasing in of the type citec scholars.

The figures q the social scie research spendi Contract Rese spending over THEMIS, who additional cent 1969 and was "support conti and allow initi that 99 of the institutions, the over \$119 mill "The increas Defense Depar institutions, tl Rec.—Senate, 1 In addition projects are no

Military Supported Research and the Pacific Rim Strategy

KEITH BUCHANAN

The maintenance of political and social stability in the Pacific Rim countries demands the use of a judicious "mix" of military, para-military and economic measures. The military assistance given by the USA to the Pacific Rim nations has involved not only massive injections of financial aid and modern weapons but also, and even more important, training of local personnel in the increasingly sophisticated techniques of conventional and counterinsurgency warfare. Between 1950 and 1968 approximately 140,000 officers from the Asian and Latin American countries margining the Pacific were trained under the Military Assistance Programme (Military Assistance Facts, US Department of Defense 1969). From these same countries and Australia over 400 officers received training in various aspects of Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare (Congressional Record, 29 December 1969, pp. E10993 sq.). Conventional forces are backed up by a para-military police force and between 1961 and 1969 almost 100 million dollars of aid was given to the Pacific Rim countries to build up their police forces (U.S.A.I.D. Operations Reports); this aid includes anti-riot gases, small arms and patrol vehicles.

In the economic field, direct US aid, supplemented by aid from organisations such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Alliance for Progress, aims at strengthening the economies and, hopefully, at stabilising the social and political situation throughout the region. Private groupings such as ADELA (a corporation grouping 240 companies) in Latin America and PICA in Asia coordinate their programmes with governmental programmes and underline the increasingly multilateral and multinational character of investment in the Pacific Rim countries.

THE MANIPULATION OF SOCIETIES

It's against this background that we should see the growing input of research funds into the region. The elaboration of new weapons systems involved in McNamara's concept of the "electronic battlefield", the prosecution of successful counterinsurgency wars, the penetration of new markets—all these are increasingly regarded as being dependent upon intensified research programmes into the problems involved. This research is not merely in the technological field but also in the field of the social sciences for knowledge of the customs, beliefs and behaviour patterns of the societies of the Pacific Rim countries is seen as essential if these societies are to be manipulated in the interests of the richer and more powerful nations of the region. The great foundations—notably Ford and Rockefeller—have long played an important role in this process; their funding of educational programmes designed to create a western-oriented elite (see, for example, David Horowitz's analysis in Ramparts, April, May and October 1969 and Philip Altbach in United Asia May-June 1970) and their work in the field of population illustrate this manipulation. Increasingly important, however, has been the role of the US military in financing research; this is a development which has been strongly criticized by Senator Fulbright and which has major implications as far as the university's role is concerned.

THE NOT SO INNOCENT ABROAD

According to Senator Fulbright, speaking in May 1969, "the Department of Defense proposes to spend \$48.6 million on social and behavioral science research in the next fiscal year. Of this amount, \$5.2 million is for studies with foreign policy implications and \$7.5 million is for foreign area research" (Congressional Record—Senate, May, 1969, p. S4417). He quotes a Washington Post report by Stanley Karnow that in Thailand "About a dozen different research firms employing nearly 200 American specialists spend some \$11 million a year in Department (of Defense) subsidies on various projects". The use of the university as a cover for counter-insurgency work in Latin America was exposed some years ago and forced the abandonment of the ambitious Project Camelot; similar Department of Defense infiltration of the University of California's Himalayan Border Countries Project in 1968 led to a prompt reaction by the Indian government and to the termination of the project (Professor G. D. Berreman in Nation, 10 November 1969). And in spring 1970 the disclosure of a series of documents dealing with a large-scale anthropological project in Thailand clearly implicated the Regents of the University of California, the Academic Advisory Council for Thailand and the US Defense Department in a programme which the Ethics Committee of the American Anthropological Association, described as "efforts at the manipulation of people on a giant scale", efforts which "intertwine straightforward anthropological research with overt and covert counterinsurgency in such a way as to threaten the future of anthropological research in South-East Asia and other parts of the world" (New York Review of Books, 19 November, 1970).

In a letter to the Press dated 7 November 1966 I drew attention to the increasing interest of the military in sociological research; episodes of the type cited above help to explain this interest—and generosity to scholars.

"PENNIES FROM HEAVEN"

The figures quoted above for the Defense Department's spending in the social sciences represent only a fraction of the Department's research spending. According to Senator Fulbright, the 16 Federal Contract Research Centers (the so-called "think-tanks") were spending over \$300 million in Defense Funds in 1969. Project THEMIS, whose objective is "to stimulate the development of additional centres of defense-relevant research", got \$28.5 million in 1969 and was to get \$44 million in 1970; this amount would "support continuation of 92 projects at 52 universities and colleges, and allow initiation of an additional 25 projects". Fulbright notes that 99 of the top 500 defense research contractors are educational institutions, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology alone receiving over \$119 million of Defense funds in 1968. He comments bluntly: "The increasing dependence of colleges and universities on the Defense Department largesse is not a healthy situation for the institutions, the students, or for our free society" (Congress. Rec.—Senate, 1 May 1969, p. S4418).

In addition to the work carried on in the USA "440 research projects are now underway in 44 foreign countries". Speaking of this

"putting out" of Defense research to overseas contractors, the Senator observes "There is trouble aplenty over military research being carried out in our own educational institutions and there is no need to ask for the same kind of trouble in 44 other countries".

SPECIALISATION OF FUNCTION

There is, however, some specialisation of function between educational and research outfits in the USA and the foreign universities linked, in Fulbright's words, "to our military establishment".

Those in the USA appear, from the listing in Congressional Record, to concentrate on the more "sensitive" areas of research and the implications of this research for policy-making. Overseas institutions contribute in a more circumscribed field, handling topics which appear part, and part only, of a bigger research project; in this respect there is perhaps a parallel to the early development of the atomic bomb, with widely-dispersed groups of scientists working on limited topics whose ultimate significance was largely unknown to them.

Focussing on the research carried out in the USA under the heading of "Policy Planning Studies with Foreign Policy Implications", we find that the total budgeted for in 1969, for work on the Pacific Rim countries, was, in round figures, \$1.9 million for work on East Asia and somewhat over \$700,000 for work on Southeast Asia. These totals, which do not include the expenditure on 21 "classified" projects, include over a third of a million dollars on counter-insurgency-related work in Southeast Asia, on topics such as studies of the Indonesian military and of minority groups in Thailand.

Among the countries carrying on "contract work" for the Defense Department, the list of Pacific Rim countries is headed by Canada (\$9.7 million), followed by Australia (\$1.13 million), Thailand (\$1.03 million) and Japan (\$0.5 million). New Zealand universities get slightly under \$100,000 in 1969 for four US Air Force contracts.

"EVEN THE BIRDS OF THE AIR..."

Grouping by content the work done under contract in universities and similar institutions in the Pacific Rim countries it appears that some \$540,000 were set aside for work on disease (including some of potential significance in bacteriological warfare), \$440,000 for arctic and high altitude research, and \$335,000 for "migratory animal pathological surveys", chiefly concerned with birds.

The significance of the high altitude acclimatization studies is evident from a paper by a Pentagon scientist in the May 1967 issue of Army Research and Development which draws attention to the fact

that mountainous terrain "occupies the whole southern frontier of Communist power from Central Europe to Vietnam". Acclimatization research at high altitudes, the stockpiling of three million pounds of feathers as "strategic materials" for cold-weather clothing (Nation, 8 June, 1970)—these fit together as parts of a "counterinsurgency intervention (that) may some day stretch from the beaches of Danang to the furthest reaches of Nepal and Tibet" (Nation, 9 March 1970).

And that "even the birds of the air" do not escape the interest of the military is indicated by the bird migration studies being carried out, with Defense Department funds, at several Pacific universities. It would be pleasant to think that Pentagon planners are preoccupied with the arrival of the first cuckoo but it appears that these bird migration studies, clustered around China in the universities of Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand, have more ominous content. As Seymour Hersh, author of one of the most important books on Chemical and Biological Warfare, has written "The possibility of migratory birds sparking an epidemic with virulent disease agents... is taken very seriously by the Army.... Fort Detrick has paid more than \$3 million to Washington's D.C.'s prestigious Smithsonian Institute for extensive studies of disease transmission by migratory birds... the Army had already tested biological agents in the Southwest Pacific in the early 1960s" (Ramparts, December 1969).

INDEPENDENT THINKER—OR HIRELING?

The exposure of the realities behind the generously-funded anthropological programmes in Thailand, the chilling implications of even seemingly innocent studies of the habits of migratory birds—these serve to illustrate the knife-edge on which the research worker in many of the universities of the Pacific Rim, indeed, in universities all the world over, is poised. He urgently needs funds and equipment and travel facilities to get on with his job and the military are able to provide all these. Most military men and some scientists evidently see no conflict, to quote Senator Fulbright, "between the role of the academician as a teacher and independent thinker and as a hireling of the Defense Department".

Others, however, will reject the basic dishonesty of social science investigations carried on behind an academic facade and devoted to collecting information among non-Western societies against whom the collected data may one day be used. They will hold that the Filipinos could well use the funds allocated by the US Army to Filipino research institutions (and the research staff involved) for purposes more directly relevant to the wellbeing of the local population than a study of birds which might be used as vectors in germ warfare. They will speculate whether the Department of Defense of any country, even of the USA, is the most appropriate body to initiate research into, and monopolise the results of, the \$700,000 study of "The Psychological Processes of the Central Nervous System" which Defense Department funds have initiated at Canada's McGill University. And many will cling to the doubtless old-fashioned belief that no group of military men should be able, because of the massive research funds they control, to influence research priorities in the educational institutes in their own or allied countries.

Mercenary armies go back into the very beginnings of history but the disturbing trend towards "mercenaryization of the mind" is, I believe, a phenomenon peculiar to our own era. And it is a phenomenon which threatens the whole role of the university as an independent centre of research and thought.



Research Studies for the Military: Oh Academia!

LIST OF RESEARCH STUDIES BEING CONDUCTED ABROAD, ACTIVE ON JAN. 1, 1969
(SELECTED PROJECTS ONLY)

(Military department code: A—Army; N—Navy; F—Air Force; D—ARPA)
From Congressional Record—Senate, May 1, 1969, pp. S4423 onwards

		000US\$		Contract Number
F University of Sydney	Study of Cosmic Radiations at Extremely High Energy	378.3	September 1969	AF-AFOSR-1486-68
N McGill University	Assessment of Military Performance Enhancement by Drugs	139.0	June 1969	NONR4896 (00)
D McGill University	Psychological Processes of the Central Nervous System	700.8	June 1971	DAHC15-68-CO396
A Lembaga Biologi Nasional	Migratory Animal Pathological Survey (Indonesia) Avian Studies in Indonesia	8.3	June 1969	DA-CRD-AFE-S92-544-68-G136
A National Cancer Centre Research Institute	Measurement of Human Complement Components in Dengue Shock Syndrome	18.0	August 1969	DAJB19-69-C-0031
A National Institute of Health	Mode of Infection of Scrub Typhus	30.0	July 1969	DA-92-557-FEC-37463
A Kanazawa University	Neuronal Activities on the Regulation of Feeding	41.6	September 1969	DA-AFE-S92-544-69-G140
A Kurume University	Interaction Between Arbovirus and Myxovirus	5.8	August 1969	DA-CRD-AFE-544-68-G127
A Kyung-HEB University	Migratory Animal Pathological Survey (Korea)	24.4	June 1969	DA-CRD-AFE-S92-544-68-G131
F Yonsei University	Metabolic Adaption to Cold	18.0	May 1969	MIPR-0013-67
F University of Canterbury	Interaction Effects in Solids	43.8	April 1970	AF-AFOSR-1275-67
F Victoria University of Wellington	Use of Mossbauer Effect in Chemistry	14.5	March 1969	AF-AFOSR-1236-67
F University of Canterbury	Gas Phase Reactions of Atoms, Radicals and Simple Molecules	15.0	February 1969	AF-AFOSR-1265-67
F University of Auckland	Chemistry of Radiation Protecting Agents	23.1	February 1970	AF-AFOSR-1417-68
A University Peruvian Cayetano Herida	Physiologic Changes in the Cardiopulmonary System by Ascending to High Altitudes	43.0	April 1969	DAHC19-68-C-0028
A -ditto-	Endocrine Alterations at High Altitude	16.6	July 1969	DAHC19-67-G-0024
A -ditto-	Coagulation Studies in Newcomers to High Elevations LA 134	14.0	May 1969	DAHC19-69-G-0002
A Mindanao State University	Migratory Animal Pathological Survey (South Philippines)	24.5	September 1969	DA-AFE-S92-544-68-G132
A National Museum	Migratory Animal Pathological Survey (North Philippines)	30.5	September 1969	DA-CRD-AFE-S92-544-68-G134
A Tunghai University	Migratory Animal Pathological Survey	15.5	September 1969	DA-FEC-309-G130
A Applied Scientific Research Corp	Migratory Animal Pathological Survey (Thailand) FE315	51.0	July 1969	DA-FEC-92-544-G0075
A -ditto-	Migratory Animal Pathological Survey (Thailand) FE316	25.0	-ditto-	DA-CRD-AG-S92-544-67-G84
A University of Medical Sciences	Investigations on the patterns of Epidemiology and Endemicity of Diseases occurring due to large scale environmental changes in northeast Thailand.	34.2	May 1969	DA-CRD-AFE-S92-544

DO YOU WANT TO CHANGE THE LAW?

Do you think that at least 1000 heads (yeah, you too) could be persuaded to meet at 2pm Sunday 1st, at Albert Park Bandstand. That each one could produce one thin joint, and light up. Press and police will be in attendance. This could force a reassessment of attitudes towards grass, and its certainly better than being picked off individually in court.

- * Tell your friends to tell their friends.
- * Come in groups (good for morale).
- * Only one joint each (and clean up at home).
- * Light up together.
- * If it works come next Sunday too.
- * If it doesn't, eat your joint.
- * This is NOT a hoax
- * Come.

Your FRIENDLY U.S.S. staff was at its
Witzend
for something to advertise this week.
So we did (advertise it, that is.)
Buy WITZEND,
Amerika's favourite
Home-made magazine

MOBILISE!



TODAY'S GREAT BEER.

last 2 weeks of sale
all winter garments
heavily reduced
come and see our new
summer range

jennifer dean
BOUTIQUE

dollar dilemma?

Perhaps we can help! The National Bank's financial counselling service for students offers advice about money handling, budgeting and general financial planning. In addition the National's Student Loan Scheme is designed to help students complete their studies. Phone Mr G. B. Pearson at our Auckland Branch (32-649) for details.

The National Bank
OF NEW ZEALAND LIMITED
—YOUR FRIENDLY BANK

4834

Dear Stephen,
Note a couple of young guys at Foru's bust his habit...
Such are the p...
vants of the Lor

Sir,
I accept Mr Rich...

Sir,
I disagree veh...
thing. Women,

Published by th...
the Auckland L...
Waikato Publis...
printers' works

NEWS SUPPLEMENT

Chaff on Craccum:



Editors Chan & Loudon enthusing at Lincoln

REPRINTED FROM CHAFF/EDITORIAL 6 JULY

Readers of Auckland's Craccum may have noticed the change in the tone of that paper over recent weeks. The vitality, topicality and innovation of early issues has gone. The vibrations emanating are now those of dejection, despair and frustration. Nowhere is this more apparent than in those articles dealing with local student affairs. Editor Chan seems almost to be whining as he writes and I cannot help feeling that this hopelessness has spread to all sections of that paper.

What has happened at Auckland is that student politicians have overrun the autonomy of the Craccum Administration Board. Chan, in order to run the paper effectively, has thus been forced to politicise himself. Having a dislike of politicians and no political base has not helped his attempt to gain a fair deal for Craccum. However, where Chan was especially vulnerable was that Craccum's criticism of Auckland's student executive has, this year, centred on President Bill Spring and Treasurer Rob Garlick who, with the end of the Administration Board as a buffer, were now directly involved with Craccum.

What has resulted is that while Craccum's content has not been politically influenced, Chan has had to tolerate administrative interference which has substantially affected the quality of the newspaper. Hence the despair evident in its columns as burden after burden is added by a penny-pinching executive who are impossible to fight as long as their first priority is their own political ambitions.

Apart from general policy decisions the executive's level of interference has ranged from refusing to allow Craccum control of its own petty cash to forcing a cut back in the size of each issue from 16 to 12 pages. The overall effect is the fall in quality of by far New Zealand's best student paper. Craccum will continue to decline as long as there is this interference and the real losers are the Auckland students that their executive claim to represent.

RESIGNATION

This sixteen page Mobilisation Special comes to you by courtesy of insufficient advertising.

The Craccum Administration Board passed a motion two weeks ago, empowering me to publish a sixteen page issue whenever a nett income of \$275 was available. Hence last week's effort. That effort was criticized for being insufficiently balanced. Unfortunately, no newspaper working on a number of deadlines can automatically churn out a splendid bumper issue at late notice. Advertising estimates do not make themselves available until late in the week. If the magic figure is reached, a frantic rush sets in as it set in last week. Our typesetters were not too pleased, since they had to rush as well. Type-set copy arrived up at Craccum at 1am Tuesday morning. The entire issue had to be pasted up in twelve hours to make the bus to Putaruru on time. One very tired Roger Fowler slunk out of the office as I ran down to the station.

The only way that good sixteen page issues can be published, is to have freedom to work to a regular pattern catering for sixteen pages. To vacillate from week to week juxtaposing figures and copy is far too much work for far too little reward.

In any case, after last week's issue, I asked the Craccum Administration Board for permission to publish a sixteen page Mobilisation Special, regardless of advertising receipts. This request was refused and the acceptable figure was lowered to \$250 with a great flourish of compromise for this issue only!

That compromise figure was not attained this week. But the sixteen page is before you spite of that.

The reason for Mobilisation Specials is because there is a rather obnoxious war going on. Our obnoxiously insufficient gestures include such things as Mobilisations, Craccum would like to make its obnoxiously insufficient contribution.

The next point I raised at the Board Meeting was a request for permission to have this Craccum sold down town by Mobilisation volunteers and to have half the proceeds go to Mobilisation Committee. I had already arranged the appropriate Council permission, had already decided to concentrate all ten thousand copies of this issue in Auckland instead of having a usual thousand distributed to other universities. But oh! horrors! giving half of the proceeds to Mobilisation Committee! But I had the motion passed anyway so Craccums are audaciously being distributed beyond the borders of the converted!

The debacle associated with this issue has led to my decision to resign. This, coupled with Mr Loudon's Chaff editorial. For some time now I have been aware of the editorial suicide I committed in agreeing to handle a twelve page Craccum. However hard the effort has been, the sparkle Mr Loudon misses seems well lost.

A man has some pride in his work, even if he keeps reminding himself that concern for the vehicle of the message is detracting from the message itself.

In accordance with my contract, this resignation is finalised after the next three issues.

INKSHED

scrivener's corner



Dear Stephen,

Note a couple of weeks back a young guy at Forum spelling how he bust his habit and is now on drugs, and appealing to those he recognised as being tied up to try the same relief. Under our beautiful laws he is liable out of his own mouth for possession, instruments, etc., and probably obstruction as well if he refused to finger anyone he knows. And under Riddiford/Co. anyone who didn't leave the Quad the minute I opened my mouth could go up for association.

Such are the penalties for the wants of the Lord.

Love,
Bob Lack.

Sir,
I accept Mr Richards proposal.
P. D. Lister.

Sir,
I disagree vehemently with the glorification of lesbianism in N. Volkerling's 'unfettered love' image. Phooey. Lesbians are women with hang-ups, and there's no sense in looking at them as liberated. But apart from being stupid, N. Volkerling's article could be dangerous, in my opinion, if it misled any young person to 'experiment' in the belief that this would be a good thing. Women, unlike men, can

choose—in most cases; I would even say in all. No doubt there is frequently ambivalence of sexual feelings in immature people; but to choose to experiment with lesbianism is simply to perpetuate it, and to create a hang-up for yourself. I suppose it is freedom of a sort, like the freedom to put a rope around your own neck.

K. Davenport.

Sir,
The article by aspiring murderess Sharyn Cederman made my blood boil. She's willing to incinerate human babies, is she? You're in the wrong time and country, dearie. Ravensbruck in Nazi Germany is where you belong. What fun you could have had killing all those Jews! They're non-human too, just like foetuses—at least, that's what Hitler and his pals thought.

Women's 'Liberationists' huh? You and your lot aren't women—you're just charity machines! Why don't you have an operation and get that utterly superfluous uterus taken out? Become in body what you are in mind—a coffin between the legs!

Sex is not just for saying a friendly hello. It is not just a cure-all for teeny hangups. It is a woman's way of saying she loves a man so deeply that she believes the world would be a better place with more like him. It is the greatest compliment a woman can pay a man—or am I the only one

on campus who feels this way?

For almost five months I have read this pauper's bumpaper with increasing disgust. Racism is not racism unless the racists are white—Kenya's apparently are above reproach. Warmongering invaders are not so bad—unless they're Yanks, judging by the amount of newspace given. The hypocrisy and doubletalk of your human apologies sickens me to the soul. Each time I see a HART notice, realizing it means Halt Some Racist Tours (i.e. South African only) I have to restrain myself from replacing the H with an F, because a FART is all it means. You despise Christian or any humanitarian ideals, but support Crowther and his hate message. Incidentally, when's the next Mobe on Pakistan?

To all you Pimple-arsed, uptight, self-righteous, hypocritical, junk-sodden, constipated little punks who run this dreary association and magazine: take note I do not intend to pay Studass dues next year or any year—a pro-murder

policy is actively supported. And if Garlick wants 50c this year he can whistle for it. Compulsory or no, I'd like to meet the bastard who can compel me to finance such assinnity.

P.S. Print this in full if you dare, punk!

Ann MacRae.

Dear Ann MacRae,

The fifty cent levy is to finance Equal Pay throughout the Association. I don't really think there is anything sinister about that. All students will shortly receive a circular from Mr Garlick explaining the situation. On receipt of that circular students should pay their fifty cents at their early convenience. As for refusing to pay your fees next year Miss MacRae, well I suppose you can write again, slandering the University Administration for refusing to enrol you. Your loving, pimple-arsed, uptight, self-righteous, hypocritical, junk-sodden, constipated, punkish Editor.

MOBILISE July 30

Published by the Craccum Administration Board for the proprietors, the Auckland University Students' Association and printed by East Waikato Publishers Ltd., of Canada Street, Morrinsville, at the printers' works Kensington Street, Putaruru.

EXERCISE

YOUR LEGAL RIGHT

Register as a Conscientious Objector

For information write or phone
Christian Pacifist Society, or Society of Friends,
12 Frost Road, 115 Mt Eden Road,
Auckland 4. Auckland 3.
695-541 606-834


WANTED

A COMPLETE FREAK AS AUCKLAND ARTS FESTIVAL CONTROLLER 1972 WITH THE FOLLOWING QUALIFICATIONS.


A) HIGHLY CREATIVE IMAGINATION
B) SOUND ADMINISTRATOR
C) CONTACTS WITH GOOD PEOPLE
D) INCREDIBLE PATIENCE AND ABILITY TO MANAGE RIOT SITUATIONS, AND PICK THE BEST CONTROLLERS

THIS POSITION IS OPEN TO ALL STUDENTS AND WILL MEAN A YEARS INVOLVEMENT IN AN AMAZING EXPERIENCE. A SALARY WILL BE PAID TO A SUITABLE APPLICANT. APPLICATIONS TO:

CHAIRMAN
N.Z. U.A.C.
P.O. BOX 6368
WELLINGTON
BY AUGUST 14.



President Woodroffe . . . 1515



MVP Lack . . . 1178



LVP Ward . . . 1227



Volkerling .

Mathematics: Auckland School

The author of this essay is a lecturer in the Department of Mathematics. Readers who perceive the style of a Penguin Introduction to the History of Mathematics are asked to bear with the essay which was written as a result of the current University debate as to whether or not Mathematics should become a School, with separate, carefully delineated Departments within it. A School of Mathematics at Auckland University would contain a Department of Pure Mathematics and a Department of Applied Mathematics for example. The author argues from an historical base that such divisions should not be made.

The important aspects of the debate are as follows:

1. The present Department of Mathematics is the largest department in the University. It is also by virtue of its bulk, one of the more poorly administered.
2. Liaison between members of staff in the Department ranges from poor to zero. This is dramatically highlighted by the fact that the debate over School/ Department has been conducted in the upper echelons of University Government. Only with some protest has a move been made to consult even sub-professorial staff.
3. Members of University Government are frightened of a possible proliferation of Schools. Will there be a School of English, they ask, with Departments of Drama, Poetry, Prose and Criticism?
4. University Government is typically frightened of any change at all and the height of the debate will be conducted with self-righteous hysteria. The debate concerns structures, not sidelines like the people involved.
5. The essay here published will not influence the debate one way or another anyway.

Peter Lorimer

The Editor.

The following story is hard to believe but it seems to be true. I am telling it here because of the effect these events have had on Mathematics in New Zealand, even down to the present day.

Isaac Newton's two greatest contributions to knowledge were his studies in mechanics, published in 1686 in his book "Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica", and his discovery of Calculus. The two were related. The greatest obstacle to progress in mechanics in Newton's day was the inadequacy of the mathematics of the day. Newton's laws of motion for example, are actually due to Galileo and others in his own day had speculated on the inverse square law for gravitation. It is perhaps a little strong to say that the mathematics of his day was inadequate because the remarkable fact is that he used no Calculus in the Principia. However, Calculus is the key to the study of mechanics and it is generally accepted, though not by all writers, that the reason Newton studied Calculus was as an aid to his study of mechanics. It is probable that he used his Calculus wherever necessary to get results and then reworked all his theorems without appeal to this new theory of his. It is amazing that this book which could be reckoned as one of the greatest scientific works of all time was out-dated even before Newton wrote it. However, it may be evidence of Newton's genius that he was suspicious of any applications of his new Calculus and preferred not to use it wherever possible. As it turned out, Calculus can be applied in this type of work with confidence but it was not until the great analysts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries finally resolved the problems involved that Calculus was given an adequate foundation.

Newton had a contemporary who could also be reckoned as one of the great mathematicians, although perhaps not of the stature of Newton. This was the German Mathematician Gottfried Leibniz. It is generally accepted now that Leibniz and Newton both discovered Calculus and did it independently of each other. However, this was not an accepted fact in their day and led to a great quarrel between them. Without going into the rights and wrongs of the matter it appears that they both claimed to be the first discoverer of Calculus and they both wanted sole credit for the discovery. The argument apparently simmered for a number of years until there was published in 1715 a lengthy review of the situation which the anonymous author concluded by giving the whole credit to Newton and almost accusing Leibniz of plagiarism. It seems now that the author of the article was Newton himself, but anyway it quickly brought the quarrel to a boiling point. The result was a complete rift between the mathematicians of Britain, who sided with Newton, and those of the rest of Europe who sided with Leibniz. Mathematics in Europe was split right down the English Channel.

SCANDAL

Here was a petty quarrel between two men, apparently aggravated by Newton into a major scandal. If the results had remained petty, it would have been all that the quarrel deserved. However the results were devastating. For over a century, the mathematicians of Europe remained completely apart from their colleagues in England. Two separate traditions arose in mathematics and these two traditions both have their inheritors in Auckland University today.

There can be no doubt that British mathematics suffered most from the split. The century or so after 1715 was one of the great periods of mathematics. The continent of Europe produced the Bernoullis, Euler, Lagrange, Laplace, Gauss and Cauchy, all among the most respected names of mathematics. Among their achievements was the development of Calculus into the subject taught as Calculus in our University today. However, the work of these men was practically unknown in Britain during the eighteenth century.

As an immediate source of this whole story I have used an article by Leonard Roth entitled "Old Cambridge Days" which appeared in the American Mathematical Monthly of March 1971. In describing Oxford and Cambridge he says (quoting Gibbon's autobiography) "the eighteenth century was a period of stagnation or even decay idle students and still more reprehensible teachers, professors who never lectured and some who never resided."

Because of his later effect on mathematics, Roth describes Newton as "the greatest of all Cambridge professors; he also happens to be the greatest disaster that ever befell not merely Cambridge mathematics in

particular but British mathematical science as a whole."

So during the eighteenth century British mathematics stagnated. It was during the nineteenth century that the great traditions of British mathematics were laid down. In the nineteenth century Cambridge was the centre of mathematics in Britain and in Cambridge mathematics meant mathematics in the spirit of Newton. In the nineteenth century mathematics meant what has been called natural philosophy, mathematics, mathematical physics, or mechanics or sometimes even applied mathematics. Cambridge in the nineteenth century produced the mathematical physicists Ferrers, Green, Stokes, Kelvin, Clerk Maxwell, G.H. Darwin, Rayleigh, Larmor and J.J. Thompson. Roth writes "during the nineteenth century British applied mathematics made spectacular strides, pure mathematics was more or less neglected and, with the exception of Arthur Cayley, Great Britain produced no pure mathematician of highest rank."

BLIND LOYALTY

As an example of the influence of Newton during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries I will include the following quotation from Roth. The Analytical Society referred to was a Society set up in Cambridge in 1821 with the purpose of familiarizing the British with the works of the great Europeans. "Until the Analytical Society brought about a change, the whole system remained tied to Newton. Out of blind loyalty to their Master, the examiners insisted as far as possible on maintaining a form and a substance of which he might have approved. Thus in problems concerning planetary motion or gravitational attraction, candidates were obliged to use the methods of classical geometry which Newton had employed in the Principia and which his own discoveries in the Calculus had already rendered obsolete even before he composed the work."

In referring to the nineteenth century Roth goes on to say that even after the reforms of the Analytical Society the examinations in Cambridge remained tests in applied mathematics. "the system was self-perpetuating the examiners knew hardly any pure mathematics anyway the mantle descended from mathematical physicist to mathematical physicist." The mathematics of Europe eventually arrived in Cambridge with the publication of "Theory of Functions of a Complex Variable" by A.R. Forsyth in 1893 and with the publication of "A Course in Pure Mathematics" by G.H. Hardy in 1908. This latter book seems to be the first book in the true European tradition that was published in England. Writing in 1937 Hardy said that "it was written when analysis was neglected in Cambridge and with an emphasis and enthusiasm which seem rather ridiculous now." J.E. Littlewood described Hardy's tone in the book as that of a missionary talking to cannibals. To put the book in perspective it worth pointing out that the foundations of general topology were laid by the European mathematicians towards the end of the nineteenth century. L.E.J. Brouwer proved his famous fixed-point theorem in the first decade of this century. However, these topics do not intrude into Hardy's book. It is simply an introduction to what is now sometimes called classical analysis. It is also interesting to notice that this book of Hardy's was a prescribed text in mathematics in this University in 1967!

In this story we have seen one of the meanings that are sometimes heard in this University for the terms pure mathematics and applied mathematics. Pure mathematics is mathematics in the European tradition and applied mathematics is mathematics in the tradition of the mathematical physicists of Cambridge in the nineteenth century.

The traditions of both the European and British schools of mathematics are present in our University today. The inheritors of the European tradition are the so-called pure mathematicians. The inheritors of the British tradition are those whose interests are in mechanics (classical, theoretical, applied, fluid, etc). The arguments and tensions between these two groups are distant results of the quarrel between Leibniz and Newton. It is probably natural that as a British colony founded in the nineteenth century our mathematics should be British oriented. It is only recently that mathematics in the European tradition has appeared here with any strength. It is now flourishing and strong and with suitable help from the administration of the University, a good future for mathematics here seems certain.

CURRENT MEANINGS

From the preceding discussion it should be clear that the terms pure mathematics and applied mathematics have no fixed meaning. So far we have referred to applied mathematics in the sense of nineteenth century Britain. In this University the following meanings are current. Pure mathematics consists of algebra, analysis, geometry, topology and some other related disciplines. Applied mathematics consists of mechanics are already discussed, statistics and computing-numerical analysis. Between the two somewhere lies the discipline of calculus with some of it being taught in pure mathematics and some in applied mathematics. The division between the two is not wholly explainable in terms of the British and European traditions mentioned above.

Algebra analysis tradition. Mechanics different sort of recently become computers. It is studied in those topics which are part of a complementary situation.

Anyway, the it is the expression that pure mathematics that thinking inside the University that might be other disciplines argument goes is useful. Pure should have a Muldoon, subsidiary influential circle argument in the interest in the prejudices in the is here. I intend argument.

In 1910 O: Princeton University curriculum at I leans, "that is Group theory Princeton prove among those v physics. The became one of thought he kne Freeman J. story in the " following com morals. The off-the-cuff pre field of compe the future of the physical sc for all. The int as various as the

On the fac hypothetical a purest of pure mathematics a that it is among the argument, but it can b propose to con

Rene Thom Fields Medal t of a Fields Med works in the I made outstanc study of cont differentiable bound to have theory of wha has classified space-time. A breaks on a mechanics. In written an a discusses the there is a sm down his theo

Differential mathematics t profound so reaching. Who much to expe in this Univer an understand are?



Volkerling . . . 1139



Rann . . . 847



Doogue . . . 768

Algebra analysis, geometry and topology are in the European tradition. Mechanics is in the British tradition. Statistics at present is a different sort of discipline and computing-numerical analysis has only recently become prominent with the development of high speed computers. It could probably be maintained that those topics which are studied in their own right are part of pure mathematics here and those topics which are studied because they are immediately useful are part of applied mathematics. Clearly these two ideas are not complementary and in any case they do not accurately describe the situation.

Anyway, the general feeling is that applied mathematics is useful. It is the expressed opinion of many including a Minister of the Crown that pure mathematics is useless. From my experience I would say that thinking along the following lines is common both outside and inside the University. It will be clear that it is the sort of argument that might be popular among applied mathematicians and those in other disciplines who find mathematics useful in their work. The argument goes as follows in its starkest terms. "Applied mathematics is useful. Pure mathematics is useless. Therefore applied mathematics should have a lot of emphasis in the University and pure mathematics should have a little." I believe that the Minister of Finance, Mr Muldoon, subscribes to this theory and I know that it is popular in influential circles in the University. My object now is to examine this argument in the hope that I can demolish it. I should add that my interest in the matter is as a pure mathematician but I hope that my prejudices in this direction do not blind me to what the true situation is here. I intend to examine the terms useful and useless as used in the argument.

USEFUL AND WRONG

In 1910 Oswald Veblen and James Jeans, both Professors at Princeton University were discussing the reform of the mathematics curriculum at Princeton. "We may as well cut out group theory," said Jeans, "that is a subject which will never be of any use in Physics." Group theory continued to be taught at Princeton and later, two Princeton professors, Hermann Weyl and Eugene Wigner were eminent among those who pioneered the group-theoretical point of view in physics. The application of group theory to physical phenomena became one of the great successes in Physics in this century. Jeans thought he knew what Mathematics was useful and he was wrong.

Freeman J. Dyson, also a professor at Princeton, reported this story in the "Scientific American" in September 1964 and had the following comments to make on it "This little story has several morals. The first moral is that scientists ought not to make off-the-cuff pronouncements concerning matters outside their special field of competence. . . . The second and more serious moral is that the future of science is unpredictable. The place of mathematics in the physical sciences is not something that can be defined once and for all. The inter relations of mathematics with science are as rich and as various as the texture of science itself."

On the face of it, this example would seem to demolish the hypothetical argument mentioned above. In fact group theory is the purest of pure disciplines. But its influence pervades the whole of mathematics and physicists, chemists and some others would admit that it is among the most useful of mathematical disciplines. However, the argument I gave was in its starkest outlines. With a few ifs and buts it can be extended to include the above situation. Hence I propose to continue this analysis further.

Rene Thom is a French mathematician. He has been awarded a Fields Medal by the International Mathematics Union. The standing of a Fields Medal is roughly equivalent to that of a Nobel Prize. Thom works in the field of differential topology, a topic in which he has made outstanding advances. Whereas topology could be called the study of continuous maps, differential topology is the study of differentiable maps. It is clear that any deep results in this subject are bound to have enormous applications in science. A case in point is the theory of what Thom calls catastrophes. Without going into details he has classified all so-called ordinary catastrophes in four dimensional space-time. An example of one of these is what happens when a wave breaks on a beach. Thus his theories have application in applied mechanics. In Volume 8 of the journal "Topology", Thom has written an article entitled "Topological Models in Biology." It discusses the applications of his theories to biology. In fact, whenever there is a smooth process in four dimensional space-time which breaks down his theories will have applications.

Differential Topology is an example of a subject from pure mathematics that has obvious applications in science. The theories are profound so that the applications should be expected to be far reaching. Who can tell what mathematics will be useful? Is it too much to expect that anyone who has an opinion about mathematics in this University in terms of a pure-applied split should at least have an understanding of differential topology and what its main results are?

HOMOLOGICAL

I chose differential topology in this example because it is a pure mathematics discipline and it has some easily stated and easily referred to applications. I could have chosen other examples. The ideas of general topology are at the basis of Einstein's work in general relativity. I could have asked what the future uses of new disciplines such as homological algebra are.

The point I have been trying to make is that it is a futile exercise to split mathematics up along any useful-useless lines.

Another example—told to me by Professor H. G. Forder. Imagine a town in the wild west of the United States last century—a shoot out in the bar—one man desperately ill with a bullet that went in but didn't comyout—the doctor faced with the problem—where is the bullet? If he has time as this stage the doctor might begin to speculate. "Wouldn't it be wonderful to have a machine that would enable me to get a picture of the bullet inside the man so that I would know exactly what I have to do before I begin to operate?" Of course we do have such a machine now, an X-ray machine. As it happens, X-ray were discovered by accident by Roentgen while he was conducting some other research. But imagine now the doctor as a young man. He gets inspired with the idea of producing a machine that will enable doctors to see bullets inside men. He obtains the support of Congress and employs some excellent scientists to help him. Would he have been successful? Very unlikely. This perhaps illustrates that the direct approach to a problem in science is not always the successful one. In fact I don't suppose that any doctor ever had the seemingly incredible idea of a machine that would see bullets inside a person. But if he did he would not have been able to invent it. Its actual construction came from a completely unrelated discovery. Once again it does not pay to speculate about what is useful and what is not.

This article has consisted of two parts. In the first I have outlined the historical background of a dispute that exists among some of the members of this University. In the second I have outlined some objections I have to opinions that I believe are held by some influential people, including a Minister of the Crown. I hope this article will be part of a process in which we can all gain some enlightenment.

ELECTIONS

The new officers of the Association are depicted in John Miller's photographs above. Russell Bartlett will offer a consideration of the elections in the next issue. That issue will also present the candidates for Executive portfolios.

STOP PRESS

Paul Carew has been elected unopposed to the position of Publications Officer. Mike Butler has been elected unopposed to he position of House Committee Chairman. All the other positions will be contested. Some positions have attracted three or four contenders. Policies will be printed in the next craccum.

education

What is your attitude to exams? Do you feel that they give a truly accurate measure of your ability and potential in your course of study? Do you think that it is fair that the whole of your year's work should be judged on your performance in a prescribed number of three-hour exams? Quentin Brew, one of our student counsellors, has spoken of exams as being the most obvious of a student's natural and unnatural enemies; To quote him further:

"If a clever and somewhat sadistic committee deliberated upon the surest way to frustrate youth, what would they come up with? The secondary school and university examination systems. Some so-called 'backward societies' grant adult status after a short period of challenge, stress, and ritual-spearling a lion or being circumcised. For our brighter youth we believe in time payment—at least ten years of examinations from 13 to 23. This is perhaps comparable to repeated circumcision—in deed one psychiatrist writes of castration fears being reactivated by exams".

If you are at present suffering from a bad case of castration fear, the Education Committee can offer a suggested remedy. We have arranged a series of seminars on the subject of exams and assessment. We have invited a variety of speakers with a variety of viewpoints on the subject. They will be speaking at 1pm on the 10th, 11th and 12th of August in a place as yet unknown to me.

* * * * *

All staff members will soon be receiving (unless they have received it already) a booklet on the role of assessment in higher education written by Michael Bassey and edited by N.Z.U.S.A. Research Officer Lindsay Wright. The Education Committee hopes that staff members will read it and consider what it has to say. We would also like to thank Lindsay for preparing the booklet and making it available to us and the staff of the university.

— RICHARD GYDE

EACH TO HIS OWN TOMB

TOTAL THEATRE IS

IT IS poetry dance rock
vision death

IT IS university hall
thursday 29 july 8.15
friday 20 july 8.45
monday 1 august 8.15


IT IS a statement to the dead
IT IS NOT for you if you like the rut you are in

tomb

progressive books

A REPUTATION TO MAINTAIN
A REPUTATION TO MAKE
and a history unrivalled
in literature of the left
PROGRESSIVE BOOKS
14-16 DARBY STREET
AUCKLAND

25 minute colour
FILM
ART SCENE - USA
Contemporary American Art
Works of Today's best
painters
sculptors
dancers
1.15pm tomorrow
friday 30 july USIS
27 symonds street



JOHN REID'S

Suppliers of ALES,
WINES & SPIRITS

The home of
TEACHER'S WHISKY
SACCONE'S GIN
GUSTAVE PIERRE BRANDY
OLD BUSHMILLS IRISH WHISKEY

JOHN REID'S OF ANZAC AVE., AUCKLAND

Quaggs

Strand Arcade...

...try our waffles



\$4.99
at **ALBUMS \$4.99**
Direction Records
20-22 Swanson St.,
PH. 379-092

THIS AD TELLS YOU ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT US.

mob ilise

tom mor row

NZUSA



do your thing
this summer vacation
in the

usa

only \$669.00 return
work permits available
3 month trip



also trips to fiji, and australia
for your travel insurance, international i.d. cards,
and all your N.Z. and
overseas travel
student travel bureau
rm. 223 mon-fri. 10-5 pm.

Auckland University Students

build a valuable connection
for the future

open your
BNZ savings or
cheque account
now!

USE THE **BNZ** OFFICE IN THE OLD
STUDENT UNION BLOCK ALONGSIDE THE
UNIVERSITY MAILROOM
HOURS:- DAILY 10 a.m. to 4 p.m.

**BANK
BNZ**

THE
ALL-SERVICES
BANK

Bank of New Zealand

There are 1
to measure. T
is certain in
general magn
necessarily ha
is intrinsically
toward the w
elate its ind
the Third Wo
After the Se
diplomacy on
ultimately bein
and the ability
definition of th
1950 had alwa
1945 designate
American secu
so much disco
ideology and
liberation mov
confidence in t
military. This a
against a cer
proposition Wa
facts, as well a
strategy has
predictable and
convenient and
The Korean w
Korea, shattered
critical dilemma.
strategy and tech
Apart from poli
decisive targets
which the U.S. h
After weaken
embarking on w
its history, th
"conventional"
Fought against
unlike any in m
principles and ts
Within three mo
North Korea and
six times the to
non-combatants
one-eighth of w
Korean populat
million were ref
over one million
Korea's losses a
Jr., head of th
Senate in mid-1
Korean Peninsu
There is nothing
in brief, became

War Crimes in Vietnam

GABRIEL KOLKO

There are no census takers of the barbarism of the 20th century, and there has been far too much of it to measure. The executioners are not willing, and the victims are rarely able, to provide exact details. What is certain in Vietnam, save to those who have neither the will nor the interest to confront truth, is the general magnitude and quality of the United States's combat against the Vietnamese. This relationship necessarily has a logic and structure which leads to war crimes as the inevitable consequence of a war that is intrinsically criminal. More important, the war is the outcome of the post-World War II American policy toward the world and its effort to resolve the U.S.'s greatest dilemma in the second half of this century: to relate its industrial power to the political and ideological realities of popular revolutionary movement in the Third World.

After the Second World War the United States pursued its diplomacy on the traditional postulate of military power ultimately being based on physical plant, economic capacity, and the ability to destroy it. This assumption was also a definition of the nature of the world conflict, which prior to 1950 had always been between industrial nations, and after 1945 designated the Soviet Union as the primary threat to American security and interests. Such a premise, which not so much discounted as ignored the mobilizing potential of ideology and the capability of Third World guerrilla and liberation movements, gave the United States supreme confidence in the efficacy and strategic doctrines of its own military. This armed force was designed essentially to operate against a centralised, industrial society, a reinforcing proposition Washington thought the military and diplomatic facts, as well as its own economic priorities, warranted. Each strategy has a price tag, and strategic bombing has a predictable and relatively low cost, but it also necessitated a convenient and vulnerable industrial enemy.

The Korean war, which almost resulted in an American defeat in Korea, shattered a half-century of conventional wisdom and raised a critical dilemma. It immediately proved the limits of existing military strategy and technology against decentralised, non-industrial nations. Apart from political or humanitarian considerations, there were no decisive targets against which to employ the atomic technology on which the U.S. had pinned the bulk of its hopes and money.

After weakening its power everywhere else in the world, and embarking on what was to become the second most expensive war in its history, the United States fought the Korean war with "conventional" arms intended for combat between industrial nations. Fought against comparatively poorly armed peasants, it was a war unlike any in modern history, and the Korean precedent reveals the principles and tactics to emerge in Vietnam in a more intensive form. Within three months the U.S. destroyed all usual strategic targets in North Korea and over the last two years of the war it dropped about six times the tonnage used during the first year. The largest camp for non-combatants contained over 400,000 persons under guard, one-eighth of whom died of disease and starvation. Half the South Korean population was homeless or refugees by early 1951, 2.5 million were refugees at war's end, twice that number were on relief, over one million South Korean civilians died, and estimates of North Korea's losses are greater yet. As Major General Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., head of the Far Eastern Bomber Command, reported to the Senate in mid-1951: "I would say that the entire, almost the entire Korean Peninsula is just a terrible mess. Everything is destroyed. There is nothing standing worthy of the name." (1). The Korean war, in brief, became a war against an entire nation, civilians and soldiers,

Communists and anti-Communists alike, with everything regarded as a legitimate target for attack. By 1953, when the U.S. was farther from military victory or mastery than in the fall of 1950, the most important undamaged targets were the twenty irrigation dams so vital to the rice crop and civilian population of the North. Restraints operated until mid-May 1953, when five of these dams were destroyed, on one instance resulting in a flash flood that scooped clean twenty-seven miles of valley.

For the Koreans, the war's magnitude led to vast human suffering, but the United States learned that it was unable to translate its immense fire-power into military or political victory for itself or its allies. There was, in brief, no conceivable relationship between the expenditure of arms and the political or military results obtained. As the official Army history relates, utilising high mobility, decentralisation, and tunnel defences, the North Korean and Chinese armies greatly improved their equipment and logistics and ended the war "a formidable foe who bore little resemblance to the feeble nation of World War II". (2). Massive fire-power had resulted in enormous civilian casualties and barbarism, but inhumanity was not victory.

The implications of Korea to the United States' future were monumental, conjuring up the prospect of political and military defeat in Asia and vividly revealing the limits of its power. Massive land armies were both very expensive and of dubious utility, and it was in this context that John Foster Dulles attempted to break through the enigma with his "massive retaliation" debate—never satisfactorily translating it into a coherent and relevant strategy. Not only did Soviet nuclear power rule out attacking Russia with impunity, but even Washington in spring 1954 doubted whether Vietnamese peasants could be made to stop fighting if Moscow were destroyed, and the debate over employing atomic bombs at Dien Bien Phu only revealed that in close combat and mixed battle lines atomic bombs indiscriminately destroy friend and foe alike.

The dilemma of relating American technology to agrarian and decentralised societies was not resolved by the time President Kennedy came to office. Without delving into the "counterinsurgency" planning and assumptions which the President immediately authorised General Maxwell Taylor to co-ordinate and study, it is sufficient to observe not only that the U.S. began making its commitments in Vietnam keenly aware of the failures of the past, but it was still encumbered with the same limitations which might only repeat the Korean precedent of mass fire-power, wholesale destruction of populations, and political-military failure. Nor is it necessary to review the familiar history of how the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations intensified their involvement in Vietnam. More relevant is the distinctive character of that war, and the assumptions and manner in which the United States has employed its military might. I propose to outline the political and environmental structure of the war and to show why the United States consciously employs a technology that is quantitatively far greater than that used in Korea but inevitability requires the same outcome in Vietnam: the



destruction of untold masses of the Vietnamese people and their society, and the concomitant moral immunisation of the American people and soldiers called upon to sustain and implement the Government's grand strategy.

A WAR WITHOUT FRONTS

One of the most significant realities of the war in Vietnam, a fact which makes "legal" combat impossible and necessitates endless crimes against civilians and combatants alike, is the absence of conventional military fronts and areas of uncontested American control. The Tet Offensive proved once again that combat can occur anywhere and that the military initiative rests with the N.L.F. American forces, in reality, form enclaves in a sea of hostility and instability, able temporarily to contest N.L.F. physical control over large regions but incapable of substituting Saigon's political infrastructure to establish durable control by winning the political and ideological loyalties of the large majority of the people. Perhaps most ironically, the N.L.F. has been able to transform this American presence which it has not been able to physically remove, into a symbiotic relationship from which they extract maximum possible assets in what is intrinsically an intolerable and undesired situation. For this reason as well, they are able to endure the war the longest, prevail, and win at the end, even should they lose a great number of military encounters.

The Pentagon's statements notwithstanding, there now exists more than sufficient documentation proving that the U.S. claims to "control" 67% of the South Vietnamese population, as before Tet 1968, or 92% as of late 1969, bear no relationship to reality. (3). Suffice it to say, the Pentagon also maintains private figures, data that simply reinforces the inescapable conclusions of a logical analysis of its own releases, that a very substantial majority of the South Vietnamese are not under the physical "control" of either the Saigon regime or U.S. forces. Apart from political loyalty, which claims on hamlet control ignore, the supreme irony of the war in Vietnam is that hamlets labelled "secure" for public purposes, such as Song My, are often the hardest hit by American arms. The reason is fundamental: areas, villages, and large population concentrations the N.L.F. operationally controls frequently cooperate in Saigon-sponsored surveys and projects to spare themselves unnecessary conflict with U.S. and Saigon forces. To lie on the presence of the N.L.F. to a visiting pacification officer is a small matter in comparison to the certain military consequences the truth will invite. What the Pentagon described as the "secure" area in Vietnam is often a staging and economic base as secure and vital to the N.L.F. as its explicitly identified liberated zones.

Therefore we read innumerable accounts of free trade and movement between Saigon-"controlled" areas and those of the N.L.F., and of "friendly" villagers and Saigon's Popular Forces (only one-eighth of whom are trusted with arms) who fail to report N.L.F. combat units and infrastructures. Hence, too, the existence of at least 5,000 N.L.F. political workers in the greater Saigon area, to use minimal American figures, and the undoubted accuracy of the N.L.F. claim to have parallel governments in all the major cities and towns. American admissions that three-quarters of the N.L.F. budget in 1968 was raised from taxes collected from one-half of the Vietnamese population, that Saigon's eight largest corporations paid an average of \$100,000 each in taxes to the N.L.F., or that it purchases vast quantities of supplies from "secure" towns, is much more to the point. (4). To some critical measure, "secure" areas are both part of, and vital to, the N.L.F. And to be "secure" is not to be a continuous free-fire zone. The question is not who claims "control" but who really possesses it. For the most part, such control as the U.S. may have is temporary and ultimately is based on its ability and willingness to apply fire-power, and certainly is not a consequent of any popular support for its financed and universally corrupt regimes in Saigon.

The refugee camps and programmes are good examples of the N.L.F.'s ability to turn what the U.S. intends as adversity into a dual-edged institution from which they may gain as much as a repressive situation allows—so long as they retain the respect and political loyalties of the people. These camps were both the inevitable by-product of America's massive fire-power applied to all Vietnam and its explicit desire to reconcentrate the population so as to better control it. "You have to be able to separate the sheep from the goats," to quote one Pentagon-sponsored analyst in 1966. "The way to do it is harsh. You would have to put all military age males in the army or in camps as you pacify the country. Anyone not in the army or in camp is a target. He's either a Viet Cong or is helping them." (5).

By May, 1969, the war had produced 3,153,000 refugees since 1965, 612,000 still remaining in camps and with only a tiny fraction having been resettled in their original villages. The large majority of the refugees, as every objective account agrees, were seeking to escape the free-fire zones and rain of fire the Americans were showering on them. Their political loyalties were anti-Saigon in the large majority of cases, and the intense squalor, degradation, and corruption in the camps undoubtedly mitigates such small sympathy for the anti-N.L.F. cause as may exist. No less significant about the camps is the very high percentage of old men, women, and children in them—that is, non-combatants. In this sense, by entering the American camps refugees escape the American bombs while the younger men generally remain in the combat areas. Roger Hilsman put it another way in 1967: "I think it would be a mistake to think that the refugees come toward the Government side out of sympathy.... (They) come toward the Government side simply because the Vietcong do not bomb, and that they will not at least be bombed and shelled. I have greater worries that some of the refugee camps are rest areas for the Vietcong, precisely because of this." (6).

Refugee camps therefore become incubators of opposition as well as potential shelters for it, just as many reported N.L.F. defectors, very few of whom are regular combatants, are now suspected of returning to N.L.F. ranks after a period of recuperation. Such integration of the institutional structure of "secure" areas with that which the N.L.F. dominates, this profound lack of clear lines and

CONTD




— US GOVT APPROVED —

CONTINUED

commitments among the Vietnamese, attains its ultimate danger for the Americans when it is revealed that the Vietnamese support for the N.L.F. extends to parts of the highest levels of the Saigon regime. We know little of the process by which Vu Ngoc Nha, Huynh Van Trong, and their thirty-nine associates penetrated the intimate circle of the Thieu regime and become privy to its secrets, but it is certain that many officers, soldiers, and administrators of the Saigon regime are secretly committed to the N.L.F. cause, and it is no less certain that most other Saigon leaders are deeply dedicated to enriching themselves, even via trade with the N.L.F. regions, and are totally unreliable for the U.S.'s ultimate purposes. Such an army of unwilling conscripts, corrupt officers, and politically unreliable elements in their midsts is a dubious asset to the U.S. and alone scarcely an unmanageable threat to the N.L.F. Hence the chimera of "Vietnamisation." The various Administrations have known all this, and much more.

It is one of the lessons of 20th century history that repression and social disintegration generate forces of opposition that otherwise would not have existed, and Vietnam is no exception. No one can comprehend the development and success of the N.L.F. without appreciating this fact. Vietnamese forced out of their villages by air and artillery strikes and into decrepit and unsanitary camps know full well that the Americans are responsible. The army of prostitutes are aware of the source of their degradation. The peasant whose crops are defoliated knows who to blame. Apart from its attractive political programme and land reform policy, the N.L.F. has successfully capitalised on the near universal Vietnamese hatred of foreign invaders, a fact that has made its political infrastructure and loyalties of the people to it increasingly durable even as growing fire-power is inflicted upon them. "They say this village is 80% VC supporters," one American officer commented last September as his men combed a village. "By the time we finish this it will be 95%." (8). Such insight is scarcely atypical, but appears to be universal in the available documents on this aspect of the war.

This realism on repression intensifying resistance, as well as every other phase of the struggle in Vietnam I have mentioned, sets the indispensable context in which the U.S. applies its military power, for it long ago abandoned operating within the acknowledged political limits of South Vietnam. More precisely, by employing sheer physical might, the U.S. has sought to compensate for and transcend its unavoidable political weaknesses in its Vietnam adventure. The various men in the White House and Pentagon know better than any of us that the lines are indeed everywhere, and that the Vietnamese people are overwhelmingly real and potential enemies. And since the Vietnamese long ceased to be promising ideological targets, tractable to successive corrupt regimes, they have virtually all become physical targets everywhere. Quite apart from the results—for the United States is slowly learning that its efforts have become both militarily insufficient and politically self-defeating—the necessary logic of American military strategy in Vietnam is to wage war against the entire Vietnamese people, men, women, and children alike, wherever they may be found. So long as it remains in Vietnam, it cannot fight another kind of war with any more hope of success.



MACHINES AGAINST PEOPLE: AMERICAN MILITARY PREMISES

The original theory of counterinsurgency in White House circles in 1961 was that a limited number of men, wise in the ways of guerrilla ideology and tactics, could enter the jungles with conventional small arms and win. Given the political, military and ideological realities, this premise by 1964 was utterly discredited, and there followed a major scramble to develop new "miracle" weapons intended to overcome the N.L.F.'s clear military superiority. The problem, however, is that it requires five to seven years to translate a sophisticated weapons concept into adequate field deployment, and in 1956 weapons ideas already in progress were designed overwhelmingly for a war in Europe. A mass of exotic crash research proposals proved, on the whole, to be expensive miscarriages, and it was already commissioned projects in helicopters and gunships that were most readily transferable to the Vietnam context. The helicopter's distinctive value pointed to the defining objective condition of the military phase of the Vietnam war: decentralisation and lack of military targets. Without the mobility the helicopter provided, Gen. Westmoreland has estimated, one million more troops would have been required to fight the same war on the ground. (9).

While the United States has sought to discover and procure weapons uniquely designed for the decentralised agrarian and jungle environment, it has also attempted to utilise existing weapons first designed for such concentrated strategic targets as industry and air-missile bases. This, by necessity, has required employing weapons, such as the B-52, originally constructed for intensive, nuclear warfare against stationary targets. It has adjusted for decentralised mobile targets simply by dropping much greater quantities of explosives of immense yield on vast regions with very few permanent military installations. Militarily, the United States has therefore fought the war with whatever decentralised-style weapons it could develop as well as the sheer quantity of fire-power which "conventional" weapons employ. The preeminent characteristic of both these approaches is that they are intrinsically utterly indiscriminate in that they strike entire populations. And while such strategy violates all international law regarding warfare, and is inherently genocidal, it also adjusts to the political reality in South Vietnam that the N.L.F. is and can be anywhere and that virtually the entire people is Washington's enemy.

I am not contriving something the Pentagon does not already know. "The unparalleled, lavish use of fire-power as a substitute for manpower," writes one of its analysts in an official publication, "is an outstanding characteristic of U.S. military tactics in the Vietnam war." (10). From 315,000 tons of air ordnance dropped in South-east Asia in 1965, the quantity by January-October 1969, the peak year of the war, reached 1,388,000 tons. Over that period, 4,580,000 tons were dropped on South-east Asia, or six and one-half times that employed in Korea. To this we must add ground munitions, which rose from 577,000 tons in 1966 to 1,278,000 tons in the first eleven months of 1969. And to these destruction-intensive weapons applied extensively we must also add the wide-impact decentralised weapons that are employed in ever greater quantities alone or in conjunction with traditional explosives. For the family of cluster bomb weapons and flechette rockets, which the Air Force rates as "highly successful," I have no procurement data. Suffice it to say, these are exclusively anti-personnel weapons covering much wider areas than bombs. CS (a type of advanced tear gas) procurement is one example: from 1965 to 1969 the amount purchased went up twenty-four



times. Procurement for defoliants and anti-crop chemicals is erratic because of inventory and production problems, though the Air Force's far too conservative data on acreage sprayed has risen quite considerably from less than 100,000 acres in 1964 to an adjusted annual rate of fifteen times that in 1969. Procurement in 1964 was \$1.7 million and \$15.9 million in 1970, with an inventory in 1970 almost equal to new purchases. (11).

Translated into human terms, the U.S. has made South Vietnam a sea of fire as a matter of policy, turning an entire nation into a target. This is not accidental but intentional and intrinsic to the U.S.'s strategic and political premises in the Vietnam war. By necessity it destroys villages, slaughters all who are in the way, uproots families, and shatters a whole society. There is a mountain of illustrations, but let me take only one here—that of the B-52—which reveals how totally conscious this strategy is.

The B-52 costs about \$850 million to operate in South-east Asia in fiscal 1970, a bit less than 1969 but far more than 1968, and they drop about 43,000 tons a month. On what? The one official survey of actual hits that I have been able to locate states that "enemy camps," often villages full of civilians, "were where intelligence said they would be" in only one-half the cases. In "the other half, intelligence was faulty, and the camps were either not there or the VC had not been in the target area when the bombs fell." (12). Then on whom did the bombs fall? On Vietnamese peasants in both cases, on thousands of Song My.

Stated another way, in 1968 and 1969 the U.S. used about 7,700–7,800 tons of ground and air ordnance during an average day. At the time of the 1968 Tet offensive, the Pentagon estimates, N.L.F. forces were consuming a pack of twenty-seven tons of ammunition a day, and half that amount during an average day in April, 1969. Roughly, this is a ratio of 250 to 500 to one. Inequalities of similar magnitude appear when one compares overall supply, including food, which for all N.L.F. and D.R.V. forces in the south was 7,500 tons per month and at the end of 1968. At the beginning of 1958 American fuel needs alone were 14 million tons a month. (13). Out of this staggering ratio of conspicuous consumption has come only conspicuous failure for the U.S., but also a level of fire-power that so far exceeds distinctions between combatants and non-combatants as to be necessarily aimed at all Vietnamese.

In an air and mechanical war against an entire people, in which no fixed lines exist and high mobility and decentralisation give the N.L.F. a decisive military advantage, barbarism can be the only consequence of the U.S.'s sledgehammer tactics. During Tet 1968, when the U.S. learned that the "secure" areas can become part of the front when the N.L.F. so chooses, U.S. air and artillery strikes destroyed half of My Tho, with a population of 70,000 four-fifths of Hue's inner city, more than one-third of Chaudoc, killed over 1,000 civilians in Ben Tre, 2,000 in Hue—to cite only the better known of many examples. (14). But what is more significant to the ultimate outcome of the war is that such barbarism is also accompanied by an ineffectuality—entirely aside from the question of politics and economics—which makes the U.S.'s failure in Vietnam certain.

Indiscriminate fire-power is likely to hit civilian targets simply because there are many more of them, and directly and indirectly that serves the U.S.'s purposes as all Administrations define them. But we know enough about mass firepower and strategic bombing to know not merely that it is counterproductive politically but also an immense waste militarily. As a land war, the Vietnam campaign for the U.S. has been a mixture of men and mobility via helicopters, with the N.L.F. generally free to fight at terms, places, and times of its own choosing. And because of ideology and allegiance, the N.L.F. always fills the critical organisational vacuum the Americans and their sponsored Saigon regime leave behind. But even when in the field, the U.S. soldier lacks both motivation and a concept of the ideological and political nature of the war, which makes him tend toward terror and poor combat at one and the same time. Had he and his officers the will and knowledge to win—which, I must add, would scarcely suffice to attain victory—the American army would not be repeating the tale of Song My over and over again. For Song My is simply the foot soldier's direct expression of the axiom of fire and terror that his superiors in Washington devise and command from behind desks. No one should expect the infantryman to comprehend the truths about the self-defeating consequences of terror and repression that have escaped the generals and politicians. The real war criminals in history never fire guns, never suffer discomfort. The fact is, as the military discussions now reveal, that morale and motivation are low among troops, not merely towards the end of tours of duty, or when combat follows no pattern, and "morale goes down and down," to quote one Pentagon analyst, but also because an unwilling foreign conscript army has not and cannot in the 20th century win a colonial intervention. (15).

We can scarcely comprehend the war in Vietnam by concentrating on specific weapons and incidents, on Song My, B-52s, or defoliants. What is illegal and immoral, a crime against the Vietnamese and against civilisation as we think it should be, is the entire war and its intrinsic character. Mass bombing, the uprooting of populations, "search-and-destroy"—all this and far more is endemic to a war that can never be "legal" or moral so long as it is fought. For what is truly exceptional and unintended in Vietnam, from the Government's viewpoint, are the B-52 missions, defoliants, and artillery attacks that do not ravage villages and fields. Specific weapons and incidents are deplorable, but we must see them as effects and not causes. The major undesired, accidental aspect of the entire Vietnam experience, as three Administrations planned it, was that the Vietnamese resistance, with its unshakable roots everywhere in that tortured nation, would survive and ultimately prevail rather than be destroyed by the most intense rain of fire ever inflicted on men and women. For the history

of America's role in Vietnam is not one of accident but rather of the failure of policy.

Given what is so purposeful and necessary to the United States' war in Vietnam, and the impossibility and the undesirability of America relating to that nation by other than military means, there is only one way to terminate the endless war crimes systematically and daily committed there—to end the intrinsically criminal war now, to withdraw all American forces immediately. And while the Vietnamese succor and heal their own wounds, Americans must attempt to cure their own moribund social illness so that this nation will never again commit such folly and profound evil.

FOOTNOTES:

The following abbreviations are used in the notes:

NYT — New York Times.

Committee on Appropriations, DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENCE

HEARINGS,

DOD — U.S. House, Committee on Appropriations, HEARINGS, DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENCE APPROPRIATIONS, the appropriate fiscal year being considered, part, and page.

- (1) U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, HEARINGS: MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST. 82:1. (Washington, 1951), p.3075.
- (2) Walter G. Hermes, TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT (U.S. Army in the Korean War Official series) (Washington, 1966), p.499. For other data on Korea see also Robert Frank Futrell, THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN KOREA, 1950-1953 (New York, 1961), pp.195, 344, 452-3, 645; Hermes, TRUCE TENT, pp. 321-24, 460-61, 477-511; U.S. Senate, MILITARY SITUATION, pp.3545-46; VOICE OF KOREA, February 21, 1951, p.493; June 25, 1951, p.518; David Rees, KOREA: THE LIMITED WAR (New York, 1964), pp.440-41; no author, "The Attack on the Irrigation Dams in North Korea," AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY, Winter 1953-54, pp.40-61.
- (3) NYT, October 16, 1969; Rep. John V. Tunney (U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs), REPORT: MEASURING HAMLET SECURITY IN VIETNAM. December 1968. 90:2 (Washington 1969), passim; William G. Corson, THE BETRAYAL (New York, 1968), pp.231-42; U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, REPORT: VIETNAM: DECEMBER 1969. February 2, 1970. 91:2 (Washington 1970), pp.4-6; Townsend Hoopes, THE LIMITS OF INTERVENTION (New York, 1969), pp.188-89.
- (4) WALL STREET JOURNAL, November 5, 1969; U.S. Senate, VIETNAM: DECEMBER 1969, p.8; Katsuchi Honda, THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (translations from ASAHI SHIMBUN) (Tokyo, 1968), passim; (London) SUNDAY TIMES, September 28, 1969; NYT, November 12, 1969; WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 9, 1969.
- (5) Lloyd Norman, "War without Gadgets," ARMY, December 1966, p.58. See also U.S. Senate, VIETNAM: DECEMBER 1969, p.4.
- (6) U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, HEARING: CIVILIAN CASUALTY, SOCIAL WELFARE, AND REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. 90:1. (Washington, 1968), p.145. See also IBID., pp.66-68, 76, 124, 143, 321; NYT, November 22, 1969, January 22, 1970; Tom Buckley, "What's Life Like in Vietcong Territory," NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, November 23, 1969, p.140; U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, HEARINGS: CIVILIAN CASUALTY, SOCIAL WELFARE AND REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. 91:1. (Washington, 1969), p.13.
- (7) NYT, November 4, 1969; U.S. Senate, VIETNAM: DECEMBER 1969, p.5. and passim; Hoopes, LIMITS OF INTERVENTION, p.188; NYT, November 21, 29, 30, 1969; WALL STREET JOURNAL, November 5, 1969.
- (8) NYT, September 24, 1969. See also U.S. Senate, CIVILIAN CASUALTY, 90:1, p.67; Hoopes, LIMITS OF INTERVENTION, pp.68-73; U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, HEARINGS: CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: U.S. POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS. 91:1 (Washington, 1970), pp.97, 250-51; Buckley, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, pp.137, 140.
- (9) Norman, ARMY, p.56 and passim; DOD, 1969, Pt. 2, pp.33-34; DOD, 1968, Pt. 3, p.13; Brig. Gen Lynn D. Smith, "Facts, Not Opinions," ARMY, December 1969, p.26.
- (10) Robert M. Kipp, "Counterinsurgency From 30,000 Feet: The B-52 in Vietnam," AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW, January-February 1968, p.17.
- (11) Joseph W. Marshall (chief, Magazine & Book Branch, Directorate for Defense Information, Office of the Asst. Sec. of Defence for Public Affairs) to Gabriel Kolko, December 9, 1969; Marshall to Edward S. Herman, January 15, 1970; DOD, 1970, Pt. 4, p.382, Pt. 6, p.124, Pt. 2, p.756; U.S. House, CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, p.364.
- (12) Kipp, AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW, p.17. See also DOD, 1970, Pt. 2, pp.748-49.
- (13) Marshall to Herman, Jan. 15, 1970; NYT, November 2, 1968; Gabriel Kolko, "The Vietnam War and Diplomacy," London Bulletin, August, 1969, p.24.
- (14) Hoopes, LIMITS OF INTERVENTION, pp.141-42; NYT, January 22, 23, 1970.
- (15) Francis J. West, "Stingray '70", U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, November, 1969, p.33. See also DOD, 1970, Pt. 7, p.91; S.O. Aquarius, "Military Discipline, The Public and the Now Generation," ARMY, January 1970, p.26; James P. Sterba, "The House of Boredom, The Seconds of Terror," NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, February 8, 1970, pp.31ff.

Senator Mc
within his own
Indo-Chinese w
Craccum, McCl
Laotian bombin
from official
misinformation
is printed to
official' and
war—Editor.

STATEMI

Subco
Conne

Dear Mr Chairman:
I would like
ascertained by n
brief visit to La
several aspects o
hearing on May 7
the impact of l
controlled by t
Embassy in Vient
That testimo:
that U.S. bombi
by the Ambass
susceptible to be
71, Hearing Rec
several years, b
decision to leav
Record) the dec
Laos controlled
nature, and not
Government offi
On our visit
were initially ad
his Country Tea
last year by the
correct as of that
We later re
testimony and
only was the for
was known to
impression as ea
for the Subcomm
State and Defens
Two very ser
Department-con
Laos has been t
generated during
State Departmen
fact, as well as
people of the Ur
The facts we
these issues are s
1. Laos is a
approximately
Sullivan, have b
the Geneva agre
2. An estim
villages; in the
become refugees
portions of Laos
3. Under tl
considered no l
their new loca
"refugees" on l
through western
4. At the U
13th Air Force
April 13: "I ha
these past four
villages along
Lieutenant Col
Northern Laos
that matter."

McCloskey on Laotian Bombing

Senator McCloskey is challenging President Nixon from within his own Republican Party, in an attempt to have the Indo-Chinese war halted. At the request of the Editors of Craccum, McCloskey sent his Subcommittee Report on the Laotian bombing. He remarks how his report differs slightly from official accounts and recalls some of the official misinformation placed before his investigations. The Report is printed to draw attention to the difference between official and actual accounts of the Indo-Chinese war—Editor.

STATEMENT OF PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, JR Before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate

April 21, 1971

Dear Mr Chairman:

I would like to place before the Subcommittee certain facts ascertained by myself and Congressman Waldie of California on a brief visit to Laos last week. These facts relate to and supplement several aspects of the testimony offered to the Subcommittee at its hearing on May 7 of last year, relative to the causation of refugees and the impact of U.S. Air Force bombing operations, directed and controlled by the United States Ambassador to Laos from the Embassy in Vientiane.

That testimony indicated, first, (pages 57-59, Hearing Record) that U.S. bombing operations in Laos had been carefully controlled by the Ambassador so that very few inhabited villages were susceptible to being hit by U.S. airpower, and second, (pages 67 and 71, Hearing Record) that of the refugees generated during the past several years, bombing had been a relatively minor factor in their decision to leave their native villages. Third, (pages 67-68, Hearing Record) the decision of the refugees to move to areas in western Laos controlled by the Royal Lao Government had been voluntary in nature, and not as the result of orders from either Royal Lao or U.S. Government officials.

On our visit to Vientiane last week, Congressman Waldie and I were initially advised by Ambassador Godley and ranking members of his Country Team that these facts, presented to the Subcommittee last year by the Departments of State and Defense, remained true and correct as of that date, April 13, 1971.

We later received evidence, however, both by way of oral testimony and official government documents, indicating that not only was the foregoing testimony not correct as of April 13, 1971, it was known to be incorrect and to have created a misleading impression as early as August, 1970, when the final documentation for the Subcommittee's report was submitted by the Departments of State and Defense.

Two very serious issues are thus raised by these conflicts. First, I am concerned that a very real possibility exists that a State Department-controlled aerial bombardment of villages in Northern Laos has been the compelling reason for the 100,000-plus refugees generated during 1968 and 1969. Second, it appears probable that the State Department has pursued a deliberate policy of concealing this fact, as well as the facts of the bombing, from the Congress and people of the United States.

The facts we have ascertained in the past week which relate to these issues are set forth as follows:

1. Laos is a nation estimated to have some 9,400 small villages, approximately 3,500 of which, according to former Ambassador Sullivan, have been located in Pathet Lao or contested territory since the Geneva agreements of 1962.

2. An estimated 1,000,000 people may have once lived in these villages; in the last ten years perhaps 700,000 of these people have become refugees, (page 31, Hearing Record) moving into the western portions of Laos controlled by the Royal Lao Government.

3. Under the USAID programs for refugee relief, refugees are considered no longer refugees when they have raised two rice crops in their new location; thus there are only somewhat over 250,000 "refugees" on USAID rolls today, living in refugee camps scattered through western Laos.

4. At the Udom Air Force Base in Thailand, headquarters of the 13th Air Force, we were told by an aerial reconnaissance pilot of April 13: "I have flown over a lot of river valleys in Northern Laos these past four months, Mr Congressman, and I haven't seen ANY villages along LOCS (lines of communication)." An Air Force Lieutenant Colonel present stated: "There just aren't any villages in Northern Laos anymore, or in southern North Viet Nam either, for that matter."



5. Major General Andy Evans, Commander of the 13th Air Force, told us that his pilots had not bombed any villages to his knowledge in the seven months that he had been in command. General Evans further told us that all targets in Northern Laos had to be approved by the Ambassador in Vientiane, or by Forward Air Controllers stationed in Vientiane and flying O-1's with a Laotian observer. Ambassador Godley later confirmed to us that no villages had been bombed without his consent, save in occasional circumstances of pilot error. Ambassador Sullivan stated to us that perhaps eight such errors had been reported to him during the 4½ years he served as Ambassador to Laos, and prior to his departure shortly after President Nixon took office.

6. While at Udom, I circled eight villages on the map of North Central Laos, and asked to see aerial photographs of the villages. Two days later, General Evans showed me photographs of two of the areas involved, and conceded that the villages no longer existed. He stated that they had been unable to find photographs of the other six villages. He further stated that he saw no difficulty in giving me the two photographs in question, but that he would like to discuss my request for them with his boss, General Clay in Saigon. In visiting General Clay's headquarters the following day, I was advised by General Ernest Hardin, Vice Commander of the 7th Air Force, that General Clay had decided that I should make a formal request for the photographs through the Department of Legislative Liaison at the Pentagon. Copies of that request and two earlier such requests are attached to this statement as Exhibits A, B and C.

7. On the evening of April 13, at a dinner at the home of Ambassador Godley, we were told by various ranking Country Team officials, in the presence of both the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission Montague Stearnes that (1) no hard data was available on refugee attitudes, (2) no surveys of refugee attitudes had been attempted because of lack of staff, (3) bombing was certainly no more than one of the factors, and certainly not a major factor in causing refugees to leave their homes, and (4) bombing of civilian villages was very rare, and then only in cases of pilot error. One of the junior officers, Mr Frank Albert, mentioned that some refugees had been questioned, but his comments were over-weighed if not overwhelmed by the positive statements of a number of his more senior associates who repeatedly argued the four views mentioned earlier.

8. On the following morning, April 14, a young political officer at the Embassy admitted to me that a summary of refugee opinions had been prepared during June and July of 1970. He went with me to the office of Deputy Chief of Mission Stearnes whom I asked to see the document in question. Mr Stearnes picked a sheaf of papers off his desk, leafed through them, and finally handed them to me at my request. A copy of this document is appended as Exhibit D to this statement, but it may be summarized at this point by stating that it summarizes the responses of over 200 refugees, from 96 separate villages in the Plain of Jars area, with respect to the bombing of their homes. Quoting from page 5 of the report.

"75% of 190 respondents said their homes had been damaged by the bombing."

"76% said the attacks took place in 1969."

"The bombing is clearly the most compelling reason for moving."

9. Both the facts stated and the conclusions in this report, addressed personally to Mr Stearnes by the U.S. Information Service on July 10, 1970, are of course in square contradiction to the testimony furnished this Subcommittee last year, and it is difficult for us to understand why the State Department, knowing of the Senate's interest, would not have voluntarily corrected the record by forwarding the report to the Subcommittee long ago.

10. It is likewise clear that Mr Stearnes deliberately intended to give Congressman Waldie and myself a less than complete picture of refugee attitudes and bombing while we were in Laos. The Embassy prepared and gave to us, prior to the April 13 dinner discussions, what purported to be rather a careful "briefing book" on refugees. Three of the eight sections in the book were specifically titled as relating to Xieng Khouang Province. The refugee survey report of July 10, 1970, is entitled "Xieng Khouang Province Refugees in Vientiane Plain" and we accidentally learned from Mr Albert on April 16 that Mr Stearnes had called Mr Albert into his office on the afternoon of the 13th, (just prior to the dinner) and asked him if he was the one who had prepared the report in question. Bearing in mind that this report, and a shorter report of similar survey of refugees in a more northerly camp, (Exhibit E) were the ONLY such reports in the Embassy's possession on the impact of bombing on refugees, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the Embassy did not want inquiring Congressmen to learn anything about widespread bombing in 1969, directed and controlled by the U.S. Ambassador.

11. After finally obtaining possession of the reports in question at approximately 3.00pm on the afternoon of April 14, we were able on the morning of April 15, to visit one of the refugee camps, Ban Na Nga, located about 40 kilometers north of Vientiane. We were

accompanied by four interpreters, including two, Reverend Roffe and Father Menger, who had been recommended by Ambassador as "unbiased."

We talked to 16 separate individuals and various groups of refugees who had come to the camp from at least seven separate villages in Tasseng Kat, one of the administrative sectors of Xieng Khouang Province. The taped interviews of these refugees are presently being transcribed, and we will file them with the Subcommittee upon completion.

The refugees were unanimous in describing the destruction of every single home in each of the seven villages where they had lived. They described both T-28 and jet aircraft, as well as the use of CBU cluster bombs and white phosphorous; in all but one of the villages, the refugees had seen people killed by the airstrikes, the most numerous being the village of Ba Phone Savanh, a village of 35 homes where 9 were killed and 14 wounded.

We personally observed and talked with a number of people bearing scars from CBU pellets of white phosphorous; the photograph of a 10-year-old boy, Ba Som Di, of Ban Theun Village, is offered for inclusion in the record at this point.

In all of the 16 interviews save those interpreted exclusively by Father Menger we were told that no Pathet Lao or North Vietnamese soldiers lived in the villages. In all cases but one, the Pathet Lao posts were at least two kilometers away; in the case of the one village, 4 PL soldiers were stationed at a supply depot 500 kilometers away. (It should be noted at this point that both General Evans and Ambassador Godley told us that pilots were instructed to avoid bombing within 500 meters of an "active village," an "active village" being defined as "one hut.")

The refugees commonly described the killing of their water buffalo, and the fact that they had to live in holes or caves, farming only at night when the bombing became so intensive in 1969. In only one of the seven villages had a refugee seen any visiting Pathet Lao soldiers killed by the bombing of his village; the soldiers were described as visiting the villages only occasionally or as passing through on the road.

At one interview, the Chief of Tasseng Kat, the administrative area where these villages had been located, volunteered the information that his Tasseng had been evacuated from the Plain of Jars in early 1970 because they were ordered to leave by the Province Governor. U.S. planes provided the airlift capability.

12. The Air Force briefings from General Evans and his staff conclusively demonstrated both the immense accuracy of targeting and bombing, and also the voluminous and comprehensive aerial reconnaissance photography which precedes and follows bombing strikes. It is clear that the Air Force is only following orders, and that all targets are cleared and approved by the State Department.

13. The total tonnage of bombs dropped in Laos in 1969 and 1970 is over twice the tonnage dropped in the two preceding years, 1967 and 1968, prior to the time President Nixon took office.

With reference to the facts set forth above, the significant and incontestable conclusion is that at least 76% of 96 small villages in Northern Laos were destroyed by bombing in 1969. Cluster bombs and white phosphorous were used against the civilian population of a country against whom the United States is not at war. The bombing was done under the direction and control of the State Department, not the United States Air Force. Both the extent of the bombing and its impact on the civilian population of Laos have been deliberately concealed by the State Department for at least the past nine months which have elapsed since the July 10 report was submitted by the U.S. Information Service to Deputy Chief of Mission Stearnes in Vientiane.

How many of the 3,500 villages behind Pathet Lao lines have been destroyed by American bombing after Ambassador Sullivan left in early 1969, is a matter which is still open to question. This question can be determined quite easily, however, by asking the Air Force to produce current photographs of these areas from its comprehensive files. If recent photos of any particular areas are lacking, it should be a simple matter to bring the files up to date by reconnaissance missions conducted at an altitude which will not endanger the lives of the American pilots involved. I hope the Subcommittee will pursue this issue until the matter is finally resolved as to how many of the 250,000-plus refugees present receiving USAID assistance were generated by American bombing practices in 1969. A specific list of nearly 200 villages suspected to have been destroyed in a single area of Laos is appended as Exhibit F hereto, and I would respectfully request that the Air Force be asked to provide photographs of each of these villages at an early date.

Whatever may be the answer, I would be hopeful that a fully informed American people will insist on an immediate cessation of further bombing in inhabited areas of Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam. There would seem to be no U.S. interest in any of these three countries which would justify the continued slaughter of non-combatant villagers by anti-personnel weapons such as the cluster bomb, napalm, white phosphorous and helicopter gunship.



Ecocide in Vietnam

KEITH BUCHANAN

Twenty-five years ago the dawn of the atomic era marked the beginning of man's ability to terminate all life on this planet. During the last five years the perfecting in Indo-China of the techniques of ecocide marks another major step along the terminal path of aborting millions of years of evolution.

Genocide as developed by the Nazis involved the mass extermination of entire human groups. Ecocide as developed by the United States military carries this a stage further for ecocide involves the destruction of the living environment which would sustain groups as yet unborn.

It is defined more fully by Barry Weisberg as "the premeditated assault of a nation and its resources against the individuals, culture and biological fabric of another country and its environs." (Ecocide in Indo-China; the Ecology of War, San Francisco, 1970).

The use of this technique of total war in Indo-China has resulted in "the most extensive premeditated ecological catastrophe in the history of this planet" and it was his first-hand awareness of the scale of this catastrophe that prompted the professor of biology at Yale University, Arthur W. Galston, to propose early last year an international agreement outlawing this form of warfare. For parts of Indo-China it is too late; the devastation wrought by saturation bombing and chemical poisoning is such as to make reconstruction in any meaningful sense impossible for decades.

FINAL SOLUTION

The techniques of ecocide have been devised to meet the challenge of a people's war. Given that the relation of the guerrilla to the society to which he belongs is as that of the fish to the sea, a guerrilla enemy cannot be defeated by conventional war.

Under such conditions, and given the mounting frustration of the military and the impatience of the United States electorate, it was inevitable that the thinking of those who make up the American "military-industrial-academic-scientific complex" should turn increasingly to a "Final Solution" by "drying up" the peasant "sea" on which the guerrilla depends. This is being done by saturation bombing designed either to eliminate or terrorise the rural population and by the massive use of chemical weapons which make the countryside uninhabitable.

This "Final Solution" or, euphemistically, "forced urbanisation", is associated with Samuel Huntington of Harvard University. The success of the policy to date may be measured by some 4 million Vietnamese casualties (one-quarter of the entire population), by the generation of 7 million displaced peasants, by the fact that today 60 percent of South Vietnam's population dwells in the "urban" areas, as against 15 percent in 1955 (Saigon's population has increased tenfold, to 3 million, in ten years so that it is now the most densely peopled city in the world with two and a half times the density of Tokyo).

DEMOLISHED SOCIETY

The psychic bond of the villager to his village is broken, the village itself razed, its trees killed by defoliation and its paddy fields and irrigation systems destroyed by bombing. The final human destruction is achieved by relocation in refugee camps, a relocation which ignores every tie of family and kinship and reduces the tightly-knit peasant society to an anonymous mass of dazed and disoriented human beings. Says a Department of Defence consultant on these processes: "We have, of course, demolished the society of Vietnam. . . ."

From the point of view of the Americans the new policy had two major advantages. First, it enabled the United States to make maximum use of its technological superiority—and to do this with the minimum of world observation. Second, the reduction in the role of the United States ground troops as the policy of "search and destroy" gave place to the simpler policy of "destroy" made it possible for the United States Government to blunt domestic dissatisfaction by achieving a sharp fall in the number of United States casualties and by withdrawing all save the specialised units needed to implement the new type of war. United States ground troops can be replaced by

Asian mercenaries which, from the American angle, have two advantages: they cost a fraction a G.I. costs and the dollars paid to their masters help to consolidate the economic position of such rickety regimes as that of South Korea.

SATURATION BOMBING

The technique of saturation bombing reached its peak in the bombing of Khe San early in 1968; here, into a circle some five miles in diameter 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped in six weeks—5000 tons a square mile. On Indo-China as a whole, according to Pentagon sources, a total of 5½ million tons of bombs was dropped from 1965 to March, 1971; this was half the ordnance expended.

The cessation of the bombing of the North in November, 1968, meant no diminution in the destructive onslaught; it merely made it possible to switch the full force of United States air power to South Vietnam and Laos and by March, 1969, the level of bombardment had reached 130,000 tons a month. By mid-1970 the number of sorties a month over Laos alone had climbed from 20,000 to 27,000 and saturation bombing had been extended to parts of Cambodia.

The troops may depart—yet the circle of death continues to widen. . . . (For March, 1971, the last month for which statistics are available, the tonnage dropped was 92,191, equivalent to 1.1 million tons a year.)

HABITAT DESTROYED


The immediate human consequences of this onslaught will be evident from the data given earlier; to these must be added the physical consequences—the destruction of the earth as a habitat for man.

And in this context two things must be borne in mind; first, that Vietnamese traditional society was overwhelmingly a peasant society, an "earth-bound" society; second, that it was also a "hydraulic" society, dependent on an intricate and sophisticated system of irrigation for the production of its staple crop, rice.

Saturation bombing has created a lunar landscape over vast areas. In 1967-68 alone, 3,500,000 5000lb to 7500lb bombs were dropped on Vietnam, each creating craters up to 45 feet across and 30 feet deep. This bombing, says Malcolm Somerville, "has amounted to perhaps the most massive excavation project in mankind's history. It dwarfs the Suez Canal and Panama Canal projects, both involving the excavation of about a quarter of a billion cubic yards of earth. The total cratered area in Indo-China exceeds the area of the State of Connecticut, 5000 square miles" (Ecocide in Indo-China, p.70). Not only has the bombing destroyed the irrigation systems over wide areas, it has also contributed markedly to soil erosion (for the newly exposed soil is highly susceptible to gullying), to the formation of useless rock pavements (laterite) on the dried-out paddy fields, and to the destruction of fragile but potentially rich peat soils such as those of the Ca Mau peninsula. And the water-filled craters form ideal breeding grounds for the malarial mosquitoes.

CHEMICAL ATTACK

The chemical onslaught launched by the American military against the Vietnamese peasantry may well have even more destructive long-term consequences than the saturation bombing since there is evidence that the substances used (245T and 24D advertised and used for weed control in countries such as New Zealand) are teratogenic (foetus-deforming) and have long-term genetic effects (for a discussion see Thomas Whiteside "Defoliation", New York 1970). The agents used are Agent Orange, a mixture of 245T and 24D, Agent White a mixture of 24D and Picloram, and Agent Blue, a form of arsenic. These are used to destroy food crops which might be used by the guerrillas (and to deny rice to 20,000 guerrillas the United States destroyed the rice supply of a million people) and to eliminate the



Filling up a bomb crater

forest cover which might shelter guerrilla groups. The area so far treated is given officially as some 5 million acres (12 per cent of South Vietnam area) though N.L.F. estimates put the total at 10.6 million acres and the Japan Science Council estimated in 1967 that "anti-crop attacks have ruined 3.8 million acres of arable land in South Vietnam" (this is about half the arable area).

The immediate destructive impact of this chemical war is evident in the dying forests and "sanitised" paddy fields; scant official attention has been given to the long-term ecological and human effects of drenching the landscape with chemicals. These have, however, been analysed by several American scientists. The destruction of the forest or crop cover in a tropical climate such as that of Vietnam leads to profound changes in soil structure, above all to the development of virtually useless lateritic soils. Destruction of mangrove forests in the Mekong Delta is leading to the erosion or salinisation of the rice-fields they protected and to the elimination of the critically important fish resources in the delta rivers.

GENETIC FUTURE

Finally, the vitally important question of the long-term impact of this chemical warfare on the genetic future of the Indo-Chinese peoples has been ignored by the military men and their civilian advisers. Tests of defoliants by the American National Cancer Institute in 1966 "revealed that two of the herbicides examined had caused gross abnormalities and birth defects in mice. The chemical 24D was termed 'potentially dangerous, but needing further study' while 245T was labelled 'probably dangerous'."

By 1969 South Vietnamese newspapers were carrying stories and pictures of deformed babies born in areas that had been subjected to spraying with 245T (see Ngo Vinh Long "Leaf Abscission" in Bulletin for Concerned Asian Scholars, October 1969); by early 1970 however, steps were taken to restrict the use of 245T in the United States of America. Meanwhile, the use of this chemical, "which may represent an ecological equivalent of thalidomide", continued in Indo-China, the scale of spraying programmes being apparently limited only by the availability of the chemicals and of suitable aircraft. Comment two United States newspapermen: "Not since the Romans salted the land after destroying Carthage has a nation taken pains to visit the war on future generations." (New York Post, November 4, 1969).

GLOBAL OVER-VIEW

As Schell and Weisberg point out, "The ecosystem of South-east Asia is one organic fabric in which all living things are tied together by an infinite number of interdependent strands." American policy in Indo-China today aims not simply at destroying the "enemy", his food crops or his culture, but the whole ecosystem of which the Indo-Chinese peoples form part and within which their societies have for centuries found sustenance and meaning; as such, it goes beyond anything attempted by the Nazis.

For just as the various elements of living South-East Asia form parts of a tightly woven and intricate web, so does this region form one element in a greater global ecosystem. The destruction of Indo-China cannot thus be considered in isolation; the diseases born of war recognise no boundaries, the chemicals poured on the devastated landscape find their way into the ocean, the oil bound for Vietnam spills into the offshore waters of the United States of America, the brutalisation and the drug addiction bred by war in Indo-China feeds back into the American internal situation.

And, indeed, the destruction of Indo-China is different only in degree but not in essence from the world-wide social and ecological destruction being wrought by "a civilisation out of control". Five thousand miles may separate the dying mangrove forests and murdered peasant communities of the Mekong delta from the menaced shores of Manapouri or the increasingly polluted New Zealand environment. But are not both the Indo-Chinese and the New Zealand situations to be located simply at different points along the same psychological continuum? James Baldwin long ago commented: "It is a terrible, an inexorable law that one cannot deny the humanity of another without diminishing one's own; in the face of one's victim one sees oneself".

Do not the majority of the ecological and social problems which confront us in our society have their roots in that denial of humanity and that obsession with technology which alone make it possible for us to accept, or connive in, the processes of ecocide in Indo-China?





After Weisberg, with additions.

RS



Registered for tra

Ed Sta

Stephen Cha
felt that if Cr
reached during
However, the B
such that it w
issues at prese
directions of th
intention of do
choice of allowi
what money Cr
and print Crac
course.

The majority
loyalty to Stephe
Admin Board wis
work they have do

The incoming
read subsidy nex
worthwhile paper
effectively on any

Would anyo
going this year
reporters, revie
contact me at th

An editor is re
Craccum this ye
as well. The Cr
editor who will
Anyone interest